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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Appellee Gene Peaden (hereinafter "Peaden") does not dispute that this Court has 
appellate jurisdiction pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2a-3(2)(j), to review the final 
order made by the District Court which dismissed Development Associates, Inc.'s 
(hereinafter "D.A.") complaint for failing to state a claim for relief on three alternative 
grounds. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL 
I. Are the arguments raised by D. A. concerning allegations that it was 
deprived of a fair hearing before the District Court unfounded and inconsistent with the 
proceeding that occurred before the District Court as reflected in the transcript of the 
hearing? (A copy of the transcript is included in the addendum.) 
II. Did the District Court abuse its discretion in treating Peaden's motion to 
dismiss as a motion for summary judgment because of the Affidavit D.A. filed in 
opposition to Peaden's motion to dismiss? 
III. Did the District Court commit reversible error by not ruling on Peaden's 
alternative motion for a more definite statement which became entirely moot after the 
District Court granted Peaden's motion to dismiss? 
IV. Did the District Court error in dismissing D.A.'s complaint with prejudice 
on grounds that the complaint failed to state a claim for unjust enrichment and/or 
quantum meruit by alleging that Peaden was unjustly enriched through the receipt of 
incidental benefits which Peaden may have received when D.A. improved its own 
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adjacent properties even though Peaden had refused to agree to pay for such 
improvements before they were made? 
V. Did the District Court error in dismissing D.A.'s complaint with prejudice 
on the alternative ground that even had the complaint alleged a claim for unjust 
enrichment or quantum meruit, D.A.'s alleged claims for relief were barred by the 
applicable four-year statute of limitations? 
VI. Did the District Court error in dismissing D.A.'s complaint with prejudice 
on the second alternative ground that D.A.'s claim for equitable relief was barred by 
laches, unclean hands or equitable estoppel which arose when D.A. intentionally recorded 
its unlawful Notice of Interest against Peaden's property with the Salt Lake County 
Recorder on January 10, 1997? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW. This Court reviews the District Court's "legal 
conclusions for correctness, granting [them] no particular deference." ProMax Dev. 
Corp. v. Mattson, 943 P.2d 247, 255 (Utah App. 1997). 
MIXED QUESTIONS OF LAW AND FACT. Where there are mixed questions 
of law and fact and this Court is reviewing the District Court's decision as to whether the 
facts come within the reach of the applicable law, this Court "review[s] legal questions 
for correctness, [but] ... may grant a trial court discretion in its application of the law to a 
given fact situation." Covey v. Covey, 2003 UT App. 380,1(17, 486 Utah Adv. Rep. 11 
(quoting Jeff v. Stubbs, 970 P.2d 1234, 1244 (Utah 1998)); see also Jensen v. IHC 
Hospitals, Inc., 2003 UT 51457, 486 Utah Adv. Rep. 60 ("'If a case involves a mixed 
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question of fact and law, we afford some measure of discretion to the [trial] court's 
application of law to facts.") (quoting State v. Hansen, 2002 UT 125, ^ 26, 63 P.3d 650). 
CONSIDERATION OF AFFIDAVIT FILED IN OPPOSITION TO A MOTION 
TO DISMISS. The District Court's decision to consider the Affidavit of Steven R. 
Young which DA. filed in opposition to Peaden's motion to dismiss and two certified 
documents obtained from public records is subject to an abuse of discretion standard. See 
Tucker v. State Farm Ins. Co., 2002 UT 34, ^  10-11, 53 P.3d 947; See In the Matter of 
the General Determination of the Rights to Use of All the Water, 1999 UT 39, ^ 25, 982 
P.2d 65; Jensen, 2003 UT 51, ^57 ("When the issue involves whether to admit or exclude 
evidence, the measure of discretion is broad [and] we will not reverse a trial court's 
decision unless it 'was beyond the limits of reasonability.'") (quoting State v. Hamilton, 
827 P.2d 232, 239-40 (Utah 1992)). 
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY AND TRANSCRIPTS 
The following authority and transcripts of hearings are attached as addenda hereto 
pursuant to UTAH R. APP. P. 24(a)(6). 
Transcript of Motion Hearing, September 23, 2002 
Transcript of Order Hearing, December 2, 2002 
UTAH R. CIV. P. 12(b)(motion to dismiss) 
RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION §106 (1936)(incidental benefit) 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Peaden, a senior citizen, purchased approximately five building lots in the Foothill 
Development near Riverton, Utah for investment puiposes. The lots were sold to Peaden 
as fully-developed lots. Sometime later the subdivision developer ran into financial 
difficulties. Thereafter, D.A. purchased approximately 400 building lots in the Foothill 
Development located in Riverton, Utah. Because D.A. had purchased several hundred 
lots it planned and desired to move forward with the development of its lots and the 
surrounding area. However, D.A. was unable to obtain building permits from Riverton 
City unless it completed certain development activities in the area. As a result, D.A. 
proceeded with some of the planned development of the area. At that time D.A. 
attempted to compel Peaden to sell his lots to D.A. but Peaden refused to sell. Peaden 
also refused to agree in advance to pay D.A. for its development expenses. Nevertheless, 
D.A. proceeded with its development activities for its own benefit. 
On January 10, 1997, D.A. recorded a Notice of Interest asserting that it had an 
interest in Peaden's property as a result of alleged improvements made to various lots in 
the subdivision including Peaden's. (R. 28). D.A. admitted at the hearing before the 
District Court that it had not complied with the Mechanics' Lien Act for the filing of a 
Notice of Lien with the County Recorder. (R. 205, p. 49 In. 23 - p. 50 In. 12). D.A. filed 
a complaint for unjust enrichment and quantum meruit alleging that it was entitled to 
recover damages from Peaden as a result of the improvements D.A. had made to the 
development for its own benefit. (R. 1-4). Because the allegations in the complaint did 
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not state a claim for unjust enrichment or quantum meruit and because the alleged claims 
were outside of the applicable four-year statute of limitations, Peaden filed a motion to 
dismiss the complaint. (R. 5-7). In opposition to the motion, D.A. filed the affidavit of 
its president, Steven R. Young (the "Affidavit"). (R. 34-37). The Affidavit presented 
testimony which sustained the District Court's determination that the complaint failed to 
state a claim for relief against Peaden. Indeed, the Affidavit clarified that Peaden had 
never agreed to pay for any of the alleged development costs. (R. 35-36). At the hearing 
on Peaden's motion to dismiss the District Court granted Peaden's motion to dismiss on 
substantive grounds. (R. 144, 205 p. 53-56). Prior to the argument on the motion to 
dismiss, the parties represented to the District Court that the prior issues pertaining to the 
timeliness of pleadings had been resolved, that the District Court's prior minute entry 
ruling based on a timeliness was to be disregarded and the District Court would consider 
and rule upon the merits of Peaden's motion to dismiss. (R. 205, p. 7 In. 5-p. 8 In. 10). 
Both parties agreed at the hearing that they were prepared for and that the District Court 
could proceed with a hearing on the substantive issues filed in connection with Peaden's 
motion to dismiss. (Id.) The District Court was very careful in indicating to D.A. that 
the Court would continue the hearing if D.A. so desired. (R. 205, p. 7 In. 20-24). Both 
parties agreed to go forward. (R. 205, p. 7 In. 25-p. 8 In. 3). After considering and ruling 
solely upon the substantive issues, the District Court dismissed D.A.'s complaint. (R. 
182-89). Notwithstanding the statements and representations made by counsel 
immediately prior to the hearing, D.A. is now arguing that it was somehow deprived of a 
proper adjudication of the motion. Peaden strongly disagrees. 
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COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
On March 8, 2002, D.A. filed a complaint against Peaden for unjust enrichment or 
quantum meruit. (R. 1-4). Peaden filed a motion to dismiss D.A.'s complaint for failing 
to state a claim for relief. (R. 5-8). Peaden's motion was supported by a memorandum of 
points and authorities (R. 9-23), and the three exhibits attached thereto which consisted of 
a copy of the complaint (R. 24-27), a certified copy of a Notice of Interest which D.A. 
had caused to be recorded against Peaden's property with the Salt Lake County Recorder 
on January 10, 1997, (R. 28-29), and a certified copy of a Pre-Building Permit Report 
prepared by Riverton City. (R. 30). In response, D.A. filed a memorandum in opposition 
to the motion to dismiss. (R. 39-48). D.A. also prepared and filed the Affidavit of 
Steven R. Young, who was the president of D.A. (R. 34-37). Peaden subsequently filed a 
reply memorandum in support of his motion to dismiss. (R. 58-70). 
Thereafter, the District Court made a minute entry granting Peaden's motion to 
dismiss. (R. 83). The District Court made its ruling in part believing that no timely 
opposition had been filed. (R. 83.). In response, D.A. filed a post-judgment type motion 
to alter and amend the District Court's Minute Entry Decision and Order, (R. 88-106), 
and Peaden filed a memorandum in opposition thereto. (R. 111-22). 
A hearing was held before the District Court on September 23, 2002. (R. 205). At 
the hearing, the District Court indicated that it was going to consider Peaden's motion to 
dismiss without any consideration for its prior minute entry based upon the 
representations by both counsel that the documents filed by D.A. should be considered as 
timely filed, and that Peaden's motion should be adjudicated on the merits. (R. 205, p. 5 
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In. 16 - p. 6 In. 8). While the District Court indicated that it was willing to continue the 
hearing to a later date, counsel for D.A. represented that D.A. was prepared and desired 
to go forward at that time with the hearing on Peaden's motion to dismiss. (R. 205, p. 7 
In. 20 - p. 8 In. 3). Based upon the consent of both counsel, the District Court heard 
argument on Peaden's motion to dismiss. (R. 205 p. 5 - p. 8 In. 3). 
DISPOSITION IN THE DISTRICT COURT 
At the conclusion of the hearing, the District Court granted Peaden's motion 
dismissing D.A.'s complaint. (R. 205, p. 53 - p. 56). The Order Dismissing Case sets 
forth three alternative grounds for dismissal. (R. 182-89). The District Court determined 
that D.A.'s complaint did not state a claim for unjust enrichment against Peaden based 
upon an alleged claim that Peaden was somehow unjustly enriched as a result of the 
incidental improvements or increase in value made to his property as a result of D.A.'s 
own development activities. (R. 186-89). In the first alternative, the District Court 
ordered that D.A.'s claims were also barred by the applicable four-year statute of 
limitations. (R. 186-89). In the second alternative, the District Court ordered that D.A.'s 
equitable claims were barred by laches, unclean hands, and/or estoppel because D.A. had 
"intentionally recorded its Notice of Interest with the Salt Lake County Recorder on 
[Peaden's] Property in January, 1997 even though [D.A.] knew, according to its 
representations to the [District] Court, that the improvements for which the Notice of 
Interest were recorded had not been made at that time." (R. 187-88). The District Court 
also determined that D.A. had admittedly not complied with Utah Mechanics Lien Act, 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-1-1 et. seq., and therefore its Notice of Interest was not lawfully 
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recorded against Peaden's property. (R. 188). The District Court granted Peaden's 
motion to dismiss, which was converted at least in part to a motion for summary 
judgment when D.A. filed the Affidavit of Steven R. Young in opposition to Peaden's 
motion to dismiss. (R. 188). 
On December 2, 2002, the District Court held a hearing on Peaden's proposed 
order granting his motion to dismiss and D.A.'s opposition thereto. (R. 206). After 
hearing the argument of counsel, the District Court made and entered its Order 
Dismissing Case (R. 182-190). On December 24, 2002, D.A. filed its Notice of Appeal. 
(R. 193). D.A.'s appellate brief does not cite to either of the hearing transcripts held 
before the District Court and many of the statements made by D.A. are not supported by 
and are inconsistent with those hearing transcripts. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. D.A. filed its complaint for unjust enrichment and quantum meruit against 
Peaden on March 8, 2002. (R. 1-4). The complaint alleges in relevant part as follows: 
[3] Plaintiff is and has been the owner of numerous residential lots 
in The Foothills Plats "B" and "C" Subdivisions located at approximately 
13800 South and 4800 West in Salt Lake County which were unimproved 
at the time they were acquired, having no approved roads, curb & gutter, 
and no connections to water, sewer, power, fuel and telephone systems, and 
for which it was impossible to obtain building permits for the construction 
of homes thereon. 
[4] Defendant was and is the owner of Lots 320, 322 and 334, The 
Foothills Plat "B" Subdivision, and Lots 379, 380 and 555, The Foothills 
Plat "C" subdivision, which were similarly unimproved and for which it 
was impossible for defendant to obtain building permits for the construction 
of homes thereon. 
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[5] In order to obtain building permits on its lots, plaintiff was 
required by Salt Lake County and later Riverton City to install and 
complete all subdivision improvements, not just for the lots owned by it, 
but for all lots located within The Foothills Plats "B" and "C" Subdivisions. 
[6] Before proceeding to install and complete the subdivision 
improvements, plaintiff contacted defendant and made defendant aware of 
the requirement to install and complete all improvements in the entire 
subdivisions and requested defendant to agree to reimburse plaintiff for his 
share of the costs of such improvements prorated to the lots owned by him 
if plaintiff installed and completed such improvements so that defendant 
could obtain building permits for his lots. 
[7] Defendant acknowledged the need to install such improvements 
and that such improvements would benefit him and increase the value of 
the lots owned by him and encouraged and requested plaintiff to proceed 
with the installation of such improvements. 
[8] Plaintiff thereafter completed all such improvements as required 
by Salt Lake County and later Riverton City for the benefit of all lots in 
The Foothills Plats "B" and "C" Subdivisions at a total cost of $2,381,302 
for Plat "B" and $3,134,044 for Plat "C". These amounts, prorated to the 
159 lots in Plat "B", equals $ 14,977.00 per lot in Plat "B", and to the 200 
lots in Plat "C", equals $15,670.22. Defendant's prorata share of those 
costs for his six lots is $91,941.66. 
(R.l-4). 
2. On or about January 10, 1997 (which was more than four years before 
D.A.'s complaint was filed), D.A. recorded a formal Notice of Interest with the Salt Lake 
County Recorder as entry number 6546371 at Book 7575, Page 0892. A certified copy of 
the Notice of Interest was considered by the District Court. (R. 28). 
3. The Notice of Interest asserted that D.A. was claiming an undefined interest 
in a large quantity of lots in Foothills Subdivision, Plats A, B and C located in Salt Lake 
County, Utah. (R. 28). The Notice of Interest provides in relevant part that "[t]he 
undersigned, Development Associates, Inc., hereby claims and asserts an interest in 
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subject property pursuant to their improvements and developments which benefit the 
following described property:" (R. 28). 
4. D.A.'s recorded Notice of Interest was recorded against all of Peaden's five 
lots. (R. 28). Peaden owned lots 320, 322, and 334 of the Foothills Plat UB" according to 
the official plat thereof, as recorded in the office of the Salt Lake County Recorder, and 
lots 379 and 555 of the Foothills - Plat C, according to the official plat thereof, as 
recorded in the office of the Salt Lake County Recorder ("the Property") (R. 183-84). 
After the Notice of Interest was recorded by D.A. against Peaden's Property, D.A. used 
the unlawful Notice of Interest in an effort to compel Peaden to pay money to D.A. before 
removing its unlawful cloud from Peaden's Property. 
5. D.A. represented to the District Court at the September 23, 2002 hearing 
that the Notice of Interest recorded against Peaden's Property on January 10, 1997, was 
recorded by D.A. before the improvements to plats B and C of the sub-division, which 
include Peaden's Property, were made. (R. 205, p. 36 In. 6-10). 
6. D.A. owned approximately 400 of the 556 lots in the Foothill Development, 
Plats A, B and C before D.A. made its improvements to the surrounding area. (R. 184). 
7. D.A.'s president, Steven R. Young, stated in his sworn affidavit filed with 
the District Court that "[b]ecause the lots owned by others were interspersed among the 
lots acquired by D.A., it was impossible to install the improvements to D.A.'s lots 
without also installing the improvements to all lots." (R. 35, 184). 
8. D.A. also represented to the District Court at hearing, and the Affidavit of 
Mr. Young confirms, that the improvements made by D.A. were made because Riverton 
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City required D.A. to make those improvements in connection with its continued 
development activities, and that D.A. was unable to obtain building permits from 
Riverton City to constmct upon its lots unless most of the improvements were made. (R. 
35-36, 205 p. 22 In. 12-21). 
9. D.A.'s president Steven R. Young also testifies in his Affidavit that Peaden 
did not agree or represent to D.A. that he would pay for the improvements to the 
development made or to be made by D.A. (R. 35-36). 
10. After the briefing had been completed on Peaden's motion to dismiss, 
Peaden filed a Notice to Submit for Decision on June 14, 2002, in compliance with the 
Utah Rules of Judicial Administration. (R. 80-82). 
11. On June 25, 2002, D.A. filed its Memorandum in Opposition to Peaden's 
Motion for More Definite Statement. (R. 85-87). 
12. On June 27, 2002, the District Court entered its Minute Entry Decision and 
Order, dated June 26, 2002, which stated: 
Before the Court is Notice to Submit Defendant's Motion to Dismiss 
dated April 8, 2002 and Defendant's Alternative Motion for More Definite 
Statement filed on May 30, 2002, and submitted on its June 14, 2002 
Notice to Submit for Decision. 
Having reviewed all pertinent pleadings and having noted no timely 
opposition being filed, AND GOOD CAUSE APPEARING, the Motion to 
Dismiss is granted. This constitutes the Order of the Court. 
(R. 83-84). 
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13. On July 7, 2002, D.A. filed a Motion to Amend Findings, For New Trial, 
To Alter or Amend Judgment and for Relief from Judgment (R. 88-89), with supporting 
memorandum (R. 90-100) and affidavit (R. 101-04). 
14. On July 23, 2002, Peaden filed his Memorandum in Opposition to 
Plaintiffs Motion to Amend Findings, For New Trial, To Alter or Amend Judgment and 
for Relief From Judgment. (R. 111-22). 
15. On July 25, 2002, D.A. filed its Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion 
to Amend Findings, For New Trial, To Alter or Amend Judgment and For Relief from 
Judgment (R. 123-26). 
16. A hearing was held before the District Court on September 23, 2002. 
(R. 136, 205). At that hearing Peaden's counsel and D.A.'s counsel acknowledged that 
all pleadings pertaining to Peaden's motion to dismiss had been timely filed and that the 
District Court should hear oral argument on Peaden's motion to dismiss based solely 
upon the substantive issues. (R. 205, p. 5-6). 
17. The District Court indicated that if D.A.'s counsel wanted to continue the 
hearing that the District Court would continue the hearing. (R. 205, p. 6 In. 14-17). 
D.A.'s counsel responded that he could "go to the merits of the motion [.]" (R. 205, p. 7 
In. 25 - p. 8 In. 3). 
18. D.A.'s counsel further represented to the District Court that D.A. would 
have previously removed its Notice of Interest against Peaden's Property had such 
request been made pursuant to the wrongful lien statute because the improvements had 
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not been made to numerous lots at the time the Notice of Interest was recorded with the 
Salt Lake County Recorder. (R. 205, p. 49 In. 23 - p. 50 In. 8). 
19. In addition to the foregoing, a certified copy of Riverton City's Pre-
Building Permit Report reflects that all curb, gutter, fire apparatus, road base and/or 
asphalt were installed before November 11, 1997 and reflects that many of the 
improvements to Foothills plat B were made before the end of 1997. (R. 30). 
20. D.A.'s complaint did not allege that Peaden had made any payment to D.A. 
for any of the alleged improvements made by D.A. to the development. (R. 1-4). 
21. The District Court considered the sworn Affidavit of Steven R. Young and 
other extraneous materials, and therefore, Peaden's motion was considered by the Court 
as a motion for summary judgment. (R. 205, p. 51). The District Court also determined 
that even without the consideration of the Affidavit and other extraneous materials, there 
are grounds which would sustain dismissal of all or part of D.A.'s complaint based upon 
the uncontested documents from the public record which were attached as exhibits to 
Peaden's supporting memorandum. (R. 205, p. 51-56). 
22. The District Court made an order dismissing D.A.'s complaint against 
Peaden on several alternative grounds for failing to state a claim for relief under Utah 
law. (R. 182-89). 
23. On October 31, 2003 D.A. filed its brief before this court. 
24. D.A.'s brief makes spurious statements about the manner in which Judge 
Bohling addressed and adjudicated the pending motions before the District Court. 
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25. Many, if not most, of the procedural statements and challenges made by 
D.A. are directly inconsistent with the actual events which occurred at the hearing as 
reflected in the hearing transcripts, complete copies of which are included in the 
addendum hereto. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
I. D.A.'s procedural arguments are unfounded and inconsistent with the 
record as reflected in the transcripts of hearing held before the District Court, which 
Peaden has obtained and attached as part of the addenda hereto. The District Court 
conducted a full and fair hearing on Peaden's motion to dismiss on September 23, 2002. 
D.A.'s attorney was present at the hearing and agreed that the hearing could proceed at 
that time on the merits of Peaden's motion to dismiss. This is true even though the 
District Court expressly indicated twice that it would reschedule the hearing if D.A. so 
desired. 
II. D.A.'s argument that the District Court committed reversible error in 
adjudicating Peaden's motion to dismiss is groundless. The District Court received and 
considered Peaden's motion to dismiss and the documents filed by D.A. in opposition 
thereto. The documents were considered and discussed by the District Court and counsel 
at length at the September 23, 2002 hearing before the District Court. In short, the 
District Court held a full and fair hearing on Peaden's motion to dismiss. 
III. The District Court made its decision on the merits of the substantive issues 
which were presented to it in the moving papers. The District Court gave no 
consideration to its earlier determination and ruling that D.A.'s pleadings may not have 
•14 .' 
been timely filed. Counsel for both parties agreed at the September 23, 2002 hearing that 
the District Court's prior minute entry would be disregarded and that the District Court 
should proceed with a full hearing on the merits of Peaden's motion to dismiss without 
any consideration as to the timeliness of the pleadings. 
IV. The District Court properly treated Peaden's motion to dismiss as a motion 
for summary judgment because the District Court considered extraneous materials 
including the Affidavit of Steven R. Young which D.A. filed in opposition to Peaden's 
motion to dismiss, and the certified copy of D.A.'s own Notice of Interest and the 
certified copy of the Riverton Pre-Building Report received from public records. D.A.'s 
argument that it was improper for the District Court to consider the Affidavit of Steven R. 
Young, which was filed by the D.A. in an effort to oppose Peaden's motion to dismiss, is 
unfounded. The District Court did not abuse its discretion in considering the Affidavit of 
Steven R. Young and the two certified public records when it granted Peaden's motion to 
dismiss. 
V. The District Court properly dismissed D.A.'s complaint for failing to state a 
claim for relief on three independent or mutually exclusive grounds. 
1. The complaint did not state a claim for relief for unjust enrichment 
under Utah law The Restatement of Restitution § 106 provides that "[a] person who, 
incidentally to the performance of his own duty or to the protection or the 
improvement of his own things, has conferred a benefit upon another, is not thereby 
entitled to contribution." Based upon the foregoing, the District Court concluded 
that D.A. failed to state a claim for unjust enrichment against Peaden under Utah 
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law. The indirect benefits which Peaden received from D.A.'s own work were 
merely incidental benefits, which occurred when D.A. undertook to make 
improvements to the development for its own business purposes. 
2. The alleged claims were barred by the statute of limitations. Even if 
the complaint stated a claim for relief for unjust enrichment, quantum meruit 
and/or an implied in fact contract, the four-year statute of limitations for any such 
claim expired pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-12-25. The facts are undisputed 
that Peaden never made any payment to D.A., and therefore the statute of 
limitations would have begun to run when D.A. first had a claim for relief that 
could have been alleged against Peaden for the improvements. Such time should 
have been no later than the date upon which D.A. filed its Notice of Interest on the 
public records of Salt Lake County, and in no event later than the date when the 
improvements were later made in 1997. 
3. Even if the complaint stated a claim for unjust or an implied in fact 
contract and the claims were not barred by the applicable statute of limitations, 
D.A. is not entitled to a claim in equity against Peaden because of its unclean 
hands. This is based upon the undisputed fact that D.A. intentionally recorded its 
Notice of Interest with the Salt Lake County Recorder on Peaden's Property in 
January 1997 even though D.A. knew, according to its representations to the 
District Court, that the improvements for which the Notice of Interest were 
recorded had not been made at the time the Notice of Interest was recorded. 
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VI. Utah law does not allow for the filing of a notice of interest against 
another's property for alleged incidental improvements made to or alleged increases in 
value conferred upon the neighboring property. The District Court accurately concluded 
that the proper method for filing a lien against another's property for improvements made 
thereto should be made pursuant to the procedures provided for in Utah Mechanics Lien 
Act, UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-1-1 et seq. The District Court concluded and D.A. admitted 
Court at hearing that it had not complied with the Act and that it was asserting no claim 
thereunder. 
VII. D.A.'s proposed amended complaint, which alleged only two additional 
sentences, also failed to state a claim for relief for the same reasons set forth in the 
District Court's Order Dismissing Case. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT 1 
THE DISTRICT COURT CONDUCTED A FULL 
AND FAIR HEARING ON PEADEN'S MOTION TO DISMISS 
The District Court handled the proceedings below fairly and in accordance with 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and the Utah Rules of Judicial Administration. D.A.'s 
accusations of the District Court's bias and disingenuous statements are groundless and 
stand in stark contrast to how the District Court actually handled the matter as reflected in 
the September 23, 2003 hearing transcript. 
The District Court had originally granted Peaden's motion to dismiss D.A.'s 
complaint on June 26, 2002, for lack of what it believed was a timely response. Once the 
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timeliness issue was resolved by both counsel at the September 23, 2003 hearing, the 
District Court was clear that it was going to conduct a full hearing on the merits of 
Peaden's motion to dismiss. (R. 205, p. 5 In. 18 - p. 6 In. 8). D.A. consented to that 
procedure. Moreover, the District Court allowed D.A. the opportunity to continue the 
hearing on Peaden's motion to dismiss to a later date if D.A.'s counsel so desired. (R. 
205, p. 6 In. 14-17). The District Court's discussion with D.A.'s counsel was as follows: 
THE COURT: It would. And if you're prepared to proceed on the 
merits, the Court is as well. On the other hand, if you - if you are 
unprepared and just want to set this again, it's up to you, Mr. Marsh. 
MR. MARSH: On the merits, are you speaking of the merits on our 
Motion to Dismiss? 
THE COURT: Yes. 
MR. MARSH: On their Motion to Dismiss? 
THE COURT: Yes. 
MR. MARSH: That was not noticed for today, and I did not submit 
courtesy copies of those documents to the Court, nor did I actually prepare 
for that motion, I was simply prepared to address our motion to set that 
aside. 
THE COURT: All right. I don't even think you're opposing that; 
are you, Counsel? 
MR. CALL: We had opposed it, and we did submit courtesy copies 
on the merits, and I - I - 1 do think that this was - the substance of the 
issues were addressed in the memorandum in opposition to Motion to 
Vacate. 
We addressed - We stated in our opposition to his Motion to Vacate 
that we weren't objecting to any of the timeliness issues, but that we 
address specifically the merits of the Court's ruling. 
So I guess it would be my position that the merits are before the 
Court today, because that was - the only response that we made to his 
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motion was we agreed everything is timely, but we - we agreed that the 
Court can look at the merits and that there's no basis for a claim. 
THE COURT: Well, is it - there has been this issue, and frankly, I 
wanted to recognize that I understand Mr. Marsh's position here, and if you 
would be more comfortable rescheduling, fine, if you want to go to the 
merits, I'm prepared and I think Counsel is. 
MR. MARSH: Well, I believe I can go to the merits of the motion, 
in which case that would be Mr. Call's motion, and he should address it 
first I suppose. 
MR. CALL: All right. 
THE COURT: That's fine. But, again it's really your decision, Mr. 
Marsh. 
MR. MARSH: Well, I appreciate that, and does that clarify things 
for me, and it means I have merits to discuss and not - not the timeliness 
issue. 
THE COURT: All right. 
(R. 205, p. 5 In. 18 - p . 8 In. 10) (emphasis added). 
There was nothing irregular in the foregoing proceedings that could warrant 
a reversal of the District Court's ruling. D.A. had a full and complete opportunity 
for a hearing on the merits of its case. See Heathman v. Fabian & Clendenin, 2>11 
P.2d 189, 190 (Utah 1962) ("The courts, in the interest of justice and fair play, 
favor, where possible, a full and complete opportunity for a hearing on the merit of 
every case."). D.A.'s counsel was also given the opportunity to reschedule the 
September 23, 2002 hearing if he chose. Instead, D.A. chose to proceed and argue 
Peaden's motion to dismiss on the merits at that time.] 
D.A. also complains that the District Court erred in not holding a hearing on Peaden's 
motion to dismiss prior to the District Court's minute entry. The argument is moot. The 
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POINT II 
THE DISTRICT COURT'S DECISION WAS 
BASED UPON THE MERITS OF THE CASE 
Peaden strongly disputes D.A.'s repeated argument that the District Court made its 
decision based on the fact that D.A.'s memorandum in opposition to Peaden's alternative 
motion had not been filed. This was unequivocally clarified at the September 23,2002 
hearing as follows: 
MR. MARSH: On June 26th the Court signed a minute entry 
decision and order which states, before the Court is Notice to Submit 
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss dated April 8th, 2002 and Defendant's 
alternative Motion for Definite Statement filed May 30, 2002 and submitted 
on its June 14, 2002 Notice to Submit for Decision. 
Having reviewed all pertinent pleadings and having no timely 
opposition being filed and good files appearing, the Motion to Dismiss is 
granted. This constitutes the order of the Court. 
THE COURT: Counsel, just so we can get right to the heart of 
where we're at today, I see this as a motion on the merits. 
I'm not going to hold you to the problem, that, as a matter of fact, 
there - there seem to have been other incidences where someone is late, and 
I'll get - I'll get submitted to me on no response an opportunity to rule on 
it, and simply do that. 
District Court and opposing counsel consulted and agreed that the District Court's default 
type minute entry would be disregarded and that the District Court would rule on the 
merits of Peaden's motion to dismiss without consideration of any timeliness issues or 
the District Court's prior minute entry. The District Court never ruled on Peaden's 
alternative motion because it became moot when the District Court granted Peaden's 
motion to dismiss. Accordingly, the District Court's failure to consider D.A.'s memo in 
opposition to Peaden's alternative motion is inconsequential and irrelevant. Furthermore, 
this defect, if there was one, was corrected when the District Court held a hearing on 
September 23, 2002. 
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But if it turns out there's - that there are a couple of days delay and 
everybody has filed their items, I routinely just vacate that and hear the 
matter on the merits. And so that's where we're at today. 
MR. MARSH: Okay. I ' m -
THE COURT: I'm not going to hold you to the fact that you were a 
couple days late, it certainly isn't something that I think the other side is 
seeking to take advantage of. I'm willing to just hear this matter on its 
merits. 
(R. 205, p. 5 In. 6 - p. 6 In. 8) (emphasis added). The District Court did hear Peaden's 
motion solely on the merits, and D.A.'s argument to the contrary is unfounded. 
POINT III 
THE DISTRICT COURT CONSIDERED D.A.'S 
OPPOSITION MEMORANDUM AND THE 
AFFIDAVIT OF STEVEN R. YOUNG 
There is no merit to the argument that the District Court did not review or consider 
D.A.'s opposition papers. The hearing transcript (attached) reflects that the District 
Court read the opposing papers and the Affidavit of Steven R. Young. In addition the 
Notice to Submit reflects D.A.'s opposition memorandum and Affidavit of Steven R. 
Young as documents filed in opposition to Peaden's motion to dismiss. The Notice to 
Submit provides in part: 
Pursuant to Rule 4-501 (1)(D) of the Utah Rules of Judicial 
Administration, Defendant Gene Peaden, by and through his counsel, 
Steven W. Call of Ray, Quinney & Nebeker, hereby requests that Peaden's 
Motion to Dismiss, filed on April 8, 2002 and Peaden's Alternative Motion 
for More Definite Statement filed on May 30, 2002 be submitted to the 
Court for decision. Oral argument has been requested by one or more of 
the parties. The following pleadings or documents have been filed with the 
Court and are relevant to the pending motions: 
Defendant Gene Peaden's Court Documents: 
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1. Peaden Peaden's Motion to Dismiss; 
2. Memorandum in Support of Peaden's Motion to Dismiss; 
3. Reply Memorandum in Support ofPeaden's Motion to Dismiss; 
4. Peaden's Alternative Motion for More Definite Statement; and 
5. Memorandum in Opposition to D.A.'s Motion for Leave to File 
Amended Complaint and in Support of Peaden's Alternative Motion 
for More Definite Statement. 
Plaintiff Development Associates, Inc.'s Court Documents: 
1. Memorandum in Opposition to Peaden's Motion to Dismiss; 
2. Affidavit of Steven R. Young in Opposition to Motion to 
Dismiss; and 
3. Motion for Leave to File Amend Complaint. 
(R. 80-81) (emphasis added). 
The foregoing Notice to Submit indicates that the District Court was aware of and did in 
fact consider D.A.'s opposition memorandum and the Affidavit of Steven R. Young filed 
in opposition to Peaden's motion to dismiss. 
1. THERE WAS NO IRREGULARITY IN THE PROCEEDINGS 
BEFORE THE DISTRICT COURT. 
The opposition memorandum and Affidavit of Steven R. Young, which were filed 
in opposition to Peaden's motion to dismiss, were served on April 25, 2002. On May 30, 
2002, Peaden served a reply memorandum in response thereto and in support of his 
motion to dismiss. The notice to submit was filed with the District Court on or about 
June 14, 2002. The District Court's original minute entry was not made until June 26, 
2
 Again, the only pleading that the District Court may not have considered was D.A.'s 
opposition memorandum to Peaden's alternative motion for more definite statement. 
However, the alternative motion was not ruled upon by the District Court because the 
District Court granted Peaden's motion to dismiss, thereby making Peaden's alternative 
motion for a more definite statement moot. 
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2002 which was 12 days after Peaden's notice to submit was made. Peaden's motion to 
dismiss had been fully briefed by both parties at the time the District Court made its 
initial ruling. Thus, there was simply no irregularity in connection with the briefing 
before the District Court. 
2. THERE WAS NO SURPRISE. 
The issue before the District Court was Peaden's motion to dismiss. The District 
Court did not rule on Peaden's alternative motion for a more definite statement. Instead 
the District Court granted Peaden's motion to dismiss. Because the motion to dismiss 
was granted, the District Court did not reach or address Peaden's alternative motion for a 
more definite statement. It is illogical for D.A. to suggest that because the District Court 
did not consider an untimely pleading in connection with Peaden's alternative motion for 
a more definite statement, that the District Court's ruling on Peaden's motion to dismiss 
was somehow defective. The argument is simply a red herring which seeks to create a 
basis for alteration or amendment when no other legal or factual basis supports such. 
POINTIV 
THE DISTRICT COURT'S RULING IS 
SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD 
The District Court's ruling is fully supported by the record.3 D.A.'s president 
Steven R. Young, submitted a sworn affidavit in opposition to Peaden's motion to 
dismiss, but the facts set forth in his Affidavit sustain the District Court's ruling 
It is inaccurate for D.A. to suggest that a motion to dismiss must be supported by an 
affidavit. Indeed, such is not the law in Utah. See Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). 
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dismissing D.A.'s complaint. In addition to the Affidavit, the Notice of Interest which 
D.A. prepared and recorded with the Salt Lake County Recorder was attached as 
Peaden's Exhibit B. (R. 28). The Notice of Interest reflects that D.A. was claiming an 
interest in a large quantity of lots in Foothills Subdivision, Plats A, B and C located in 
Salt Lake County, Utah. The Notice of Interest provides in relevant part that "[t]he 
undersigned, Development Associates, Inc., hereby claims and asserts an interest in 
subject property pursuant to their improvements and developments which benefit the 
following described property:" (R. 28). In its opposition memorandum to Peaden's 
motion, D.A. did not dispute the facts as set forth in relevant portions of Peaden's 
statement of relevant facts, nor did it dispute the authenticity of the two certified copies 
of D.A.'s own Notice of Interest and the Pre-Building Permit Report presented to the 
District Court. Riveiton City's Pre-Building Permit Report, which was submitted as 
Exhibit C, reflects that all curb, gutter, fire apparatus, road base and/or asphalt were 
installed before November 11, 1997. (R. 30). 
It is simply inaccurate for D.A. to argue that there is no evidence to sustain the 
District Court's dismissal of the case. The dismissal was based upon the allegations in 
the complaint, the Affidavit of Steven R. Young (which D.A. submitted), the certified 
copy of D.A.'s Notice of Interest and the certified copy of the Pre-Building Permit 
Report, the representations set forth in the pleadings and the representations made by 
D.A.'s counsel at the September 23, 2002, hearing. In sum, the District Court's ruling is 
fully supported by the record. 
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POINT V 
D.A.'S COMPLAINT FAILED TO 
STATE A CLAIM FOR UNJUST ENRICHMENT 
D.A.'s complaint failed to state a claim for unjust enrichment or quantum meruit 
under Utah law. The RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION §1 provides that a person who has 
been unjustly enriched at the expense of another is required to make restitution to the other. 
The Utah Supreme Court has adopted this doctrine. See Harline v. Dairies, 567 P.2d 1120 
(Utah 1977). Unjust enrichment may be an appropriate remedy if property or services are 
conferred upon one person by another, the recipient appreciates or has knowledge of such 
property or services, the person receiving the property or services accepts such benefit and it 
would be "inequitable" for the person receiving the property or services to keep the same 
without being required to pay therefor. See Desert Miriah, Inc. v. B&L Auto, Inc., 2000 UT 
83, 12 P.3d 580; Berrett v. Stevens, 690 P.2d 553, 557 (Utah 1984); See L & A Drywall v. 
Miitmore Constr.Co., 608 P.2d 626, 630 (Utah 1980). 
The doctrine of unjust enrichment does not apply anytime the benefits are performed 
by the plaintiff for its own advantage. See Baugh v. Darley, 184 P.2d 335, 337 (Utah 1947). 
The Restatement of Restitution explains the law as follows: 
§ 106. Incidental Benefit to Another from Performance of One's Duty or 
Protection of One's Things. 
A person who, incidentally to the performance of his 
own duty or to the protection or the improvement of his 
own things, has conferred a benefit upon another, is not 
thereby entitled to contribution. 
Illustrations: 
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1. A, the owner of land on a river bank, reasonably 
fearing immediate inundation, requests his neighbor, B, to join 
him in building a dike which will preserve the land of both. B 
refuses. A builds a dike which saves both pieces of land from 
being flooded. A is not entitled to contribution from B. 
2. A and B are adjoining mine owners whose mines 
have been flooded by seepage from a near-by swamp. A 
requests B to join him in the draining of the swamp. B refuses. 
A drains the swamp, thereby drying both mines. He is not 
entitled to contribution from B. 
3. Same facts as in Illustration 2, except that C had 
contracted to keep water out of A's mine, and he drains the 
swamp in the performance of his duty to A. C is not entitled to 
contribution from B. 
RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 106 (attached). 
The Utah Remedies Guide also explains the law that a plaintiff is precluded from 
recovering for services performed or benefits furnished for the plaintiffs own advantage. 
However, unjust enrichment does not apply anytime someone has benefited to 
another's detriment. In particular, the courts are not inclined to provide 
restitution for benefits "officiously or gratuitously furnished" or "services 
performed by the plaintiff for his own advantage". 
D.N. Zillman, Utah Remedies Guide, Restitution, §11 at 403 (1985 ed.). 
1. PEADEN HAS NOT RETAINED MONEY OR BENEFITS WHICH 
BELONG TO ANOTHER 
There is nothing alleged in the complaint that suggests that Peaden is retaining any 
money or benefits which belong to D. A.. Moreover, the complaint specifies that the 
improvements were made by D.A. so that D.A. could promptly obtain building permits 
from Riverton City to build on its own properties. (R. 2). A party which makes 
development type improvements for its own purpose is not entitled to recover from others 
for the expense of such improvements. 
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The law was explained in Major-Blakeney Corp., 263 P.2d 655 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 
1954), where the court addressed the issue of unjust enrichment in a real estate development 
case and stated: 
Furthermore, there is another aspect of this matter, which is of extreme 
significance in the context here present. The evidence and its reasonable 
inferences demonstrate that the improvements were undertaken as a part 
of plaintiff s own building program, that they were initiated without 
reference to any agreement with defendant's concerning the properties 
here in dispute, that defendants at no time remotely suggested they 
would pay for or contribute to these improvements made adjacent to or 
abutting other properties they chanced to own. The whole situation 
negatives the idea that defendants were expected to participate 
financially, and any benefit that could possibly have flowed to defendants 
was incidental to plans and obligations to which plaintiff alone had 
committed itself. The general rule applicable, absent other equities, is 
that a party is not entitled to reimbursement for improvements 
voluntarily made to another's land in the absence of an express or 
implied contract to pay. Callnon v. Callnon, 7 Cal.App.2d 676, 680, 46 
P.2d 988; Titus v. Poland Coal Co., 275 Pa. 431, 119 A. 540; Meeker v. 
Oszust, 307 Mass. 366, 30 N.E.2d 246; Dudzick v. Lewis, 175 Tenn. 246, 133 
S.W.2d 496. A related principle, particularly applicable to the instant case, is 
adopted by the Restatement of Restitution, sec. 106, in the following 
language: yA person who, incidentally to the performance of his own duty 
or to the protection or the improvement of his own things, has conferred 
a benefit upon another, is not thereby entitled to contribution/ The 
courts of many jurisdictions support this proposition. Raynor v. Drew, 72 
Cal. 307, 13 P. 866; United States v. Pac. R. Co., 120 U.S. 227, 7 S.Ct. 490, 
30 L.Ed. 634; Wadleigh v. Katahdin Pulp & Paper Co., 116 Me. 107, 100 A. 
150; Stern v. Haas, 54 N.D. 346, 209 N.W. 784. A property owner who 
conceivably acquires some incidental benefit from an adjoining 
landowner's improvements made pursuant to the latter's private 
development plans is not required to account for the benefits so received. 
Major-Blakeney Corp., 263 P.2d at 664 (emphasis added). 
The Utah Supreme Court also recognized the foregoing doctrine in Berrett v. 
Stevens, 690 P.2d 553, (Utah 1984) wherein the Court stated: 
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There is little doubt that plaintiffs did receive some benefit from defendants' 
action. However, the mere fact that a person benefits another is not by itself 
sufficient to require the other to make restitution. The value of the services 
performed by a person for his own advantage and from which another 
benefits incidentally are not recoverable. 
690 P.2d at 558 (emphasis added); accord Baugh v. Darley, 112 Utah 1, 184 P.2d 335 
(1947). 
The facts in the instant case are comparable to those in Major-Blakeney Corp. D.A. 
owned approximately 400 lots in the Foothills Subdivision which it obtained from the 
financially troubled developer. D.A. made improvements to the area in an effort to improve 
and develop its own lots for sale. Peaden was not involved in that improvement process, 
nor was he requested to give approval or make decisions in connection with the 
improvements undertaken by D.A. Thus, any benefit conferred upon Peaden's five lots was 
merely incidental to the improvements which the D.A. made for its own benefit. As such, 
D.A. may not recover against Peaden for any such alleged incidental benefits conferred 
upon Peaden. 
2. GENE PEADEN DID NOT REQUEST THAT THE IMPROVEMENTS 
BE MADE TO HIS PROPERTIES 
Sometime before the alleged improvements to the overall development were made in 
1997, D.A.'s agent, Milt Shipp, contacted Peaden and requested that he sell his property to 
D.A. for approximately $3,000 a lot. Peaden indicated that he was not interested in selling 
his lots for that price. Thereafter, D.A.'s agent made statements that D.A. owned a great 
many lots in the development and that it was planning to make improvements to the 
development, and that D.A. may be seeking Peaden's involvement in the development 
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process. However, Peaden did not request that the improvements be made and at no time 
did D.A. get Peaden involved in connection with the improvements made by D.A. 
3. PEADEN DID NOT AGREE TO PAY FOR GENERAL 
IMPROVEMENTS WHICH D.A. WANTED TO MAKE TO THE 
DEVELOPMENT 
The facts are undisputed that Peaden did not agree to pay for any of the alleged 
improvements made by D.A. Indeed, D.A.'s president, Steven R. Young, testifies in his 
Affidavit that Peaden did not agree to pay for the general improvements made by the D.A. 
All of the other owners, either before or after the improvements were 
completed, acknowledged the benefit to them of the improvements and 
agreed either to sell their lots or to participate in the costs on a prorata basis 
except for the owners of eight lots, including those owned by Peaden 
Gene Peaden. 
(R. 35-36) (emphasis added). Clearly, Peaden did not agree to pay D.A. for its development 
improvements. 
4. PEADEN HAS NOT RETAINED MONEY OR BENEFITS WHICH 
BELONG TO D.A. 
Peaden has not retained any money or benefits which belong to D.A. The benefits 
were performed by D.A. for its own business purposes. Indeed, D.A.'s president, Steven R. 
Young, testifies in his Affidavit that: 
Because the lots owned by others were interspersed among the lots 
acquired by us, it was impossible to install the improvements to our lots 
without also installing the improvements to all lots." 
(R. 35-36). 
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5. D.A. DID NOT RELY TO ITS DETRIMENT UPON ANY ALLEGED 
REQUEST FOR IMPROVEMENTS MADE BY PEADEN 
Even had some representation been made that Peaden would share in D.A.'s 
development costs (which it was not), D.A. could not have relied upon that representation to 
its detriment. Indeed, D.A.'s president has testified that Peaden did not agree or represent 
that he would pay for improvements and that D.A. was required by Riverton City to make 
the improvements to the development, and that there was no way of separating the 
improvements between lots. Thus, D.A. elected to go forward with the improvements 
knowing that other lots owners did not agree therewith. 
6. JUSTICE DOES NOT REQUIRE PEADEN TO PAY MONEY TO D.A. 
D.A. made the improvements to the Foothill Development knowing that the Peaden 
did not agree to pay for any portion thereof. D.A., as a developer, purchased most of the 
lots in a development and thereafter made improvements to the Development for its ov/n 
benefit and profit. The work benefited all of D.A.'s 400 lots because it allowed D.A. to 
obtain building permits from Riverton City to move forward with its development plans. 
D.A. is now seeking recovery from Peaden simply to increase its profitability on the 
project which D.A. undertook for its own financial interest and benefit. It would be a 
miscarriage of justice and an attack on public policy for this Court to allow a large 
commercial developer to recover from a private senior citizen under the facts of this case. 
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POINT VI 
THE APPLICABLE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS BARS D.A.'S 
CLAIMS FOR IMPROVEMENTS MADE TO LOTS 320, 322 AND 334 
D.A.'s claims are barred by the statute of limitations. The four-year statute of 
limitations in UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-12-25 applies to all claims in equity. The statute 
provides, in relevant part, as follows: 
78-12-25. Within four years. 
An action may be brought within four years: 
(1) upon a contract, obligation, or liability not founded upon an instrument 
in writing; also on an open account for goods, wares, and merchandise, and 
for any article charged on a store account; also on an open account for 
work, labor or services rendered, or materials furnished; provided, that 
action in all of the foregoing cases may be commenced at any time within 
four years after the last payment is received. 
(3) for relief not otherwise provided for by law.4 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-12-25(emphasis added). 
Based upon the foregoing, any claim for unjust enrichment or quantum meruit for 
the alleged improvements had to be brought, if at all, within four years after the alleged 
improvements were made. However, D.A.'s complaint was not filed until March 2002 
which was after the four-year period expired. Therefore, D.A. could not have asserted a 
claim against Peaden for incidental improvements made before March 1998. As such, 
D.A.'s claims for relief based upon improvements made directly or indirectly to Peaden's 
The four-year limitation prescribed by sub-section (3) was the proper limitation period 
applicable in action by subdividers for fees paid under a municipal ordinance. 
American Tierra Corp. v. City ofW. Jordan, 840 P.2d 757 (Utah 1992). 
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lots 320, 322 and 332 in 1997 were untimely and properly dismissed by the District 
Court. 
The improvements made directly or indirectly to lots 320, 322 and 334 of Foothills 
Plat "B" Subdivision were also made in 1997. Indeed, a certified copy of the Pre-
B nil ding Permit Report, reflects the subject improvements were completed in 1997. (R. 
30). In addition, the Notice of Interest, which was prepared by D.A. and recorded with 
the Salt Lake County Recorder on January 10, 1997, reflects unambiguously on its face 
that D.A. was reattempting to assert an interest or claim against Peaden's properties for 
improvements it had made to numerous properties.* (R.28). 
D.A. argues that even though the Notice of Interest was recorded on January 10, 
1997, the improvements reflected in the Notice related to future work. However, the 
Notice of Interest reflects unambiguously on its face that D.A. was attempting to assert a 
present claim for improvements that had been made. The Notice provides, in part, as 
follows: 
The undersigned, Development Associates, Inc., hereby claims and asserts 
an interest in subject property pursuant to their improvements and 
developments which benefit the following described property. 
(R. 28). Because the Notice of Interest was recorded on January 10, 1997 and because 
D.A. did not file the present action until March 8, 2002, all improvements referred to in 
3
 The Notice of Interest filed by the D.A. is unlawful because Utah law does not provide 
for the filing of a notice of interest in an effort to recover for improvements made to 
property. Indeed, the proper procedure for asserting a lien for improvements to real 
property is set forth in UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-1-1. Notwithstanding, D.A.'s Notice of 
Interest conclusively reflects the D.A.'s public representation as to when the alleged 
improvements were made. 
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the Notice of Interest and any other improvements made to Peaden's lots before March 8, 
1998, were barred by the four year statute of limitations as a matter of law. 
POINT VII 
THE APPLICABLE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS ALSO BARS 
ANY CLAIMS FOR IMPROVEMENTS MADE TO LOTS 379 AND 555 
The applicable statute of limitations also bars D.A.'s claims for improvements 
made, directly or indirectly, to lots 379 and 555 because both lots are identified in the 
Notice of Interest, paragraph 3, which asserted a claim for such improvements in 1997. 
(R. 28). As such, any claim by D.A. for improvements made to those lots in 1997 were 
barred by the four-year statute of limitations under UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-12-25 as a 
matter of law before D.A. filed its complaint on March 8, 2002. 
POINT VIII 
THERE IS NO ENFORCEABLE CONTRACT CLAIM 
1. ANY CLAIM FOR AN IMPLIED CONTRACT IS ALSO BARRED BY 
THE FOUR-YEAR STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS 
An oral or implied-in-fact contract is subject to the four-year statute of limitations set 
forth in UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-12-25. The statute states that an action upon a contract, 
obligation, or liability not founded upon an instrument in writing . . . must be brought 
within four years. Id. Because D.A. made the alleged improvements to Peaden's 
properties in 1997, a claim upon any such alleged contract must have been brought within 
four years. Therefore, even had an implied contract existed between the parties, the time for 
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asserting a claim based thereon is barred by the applicable statute of limitations. Therefore, 
D.A.'s claim based upon an oral or implied-in-fact contract was untimely as matter of law.6 
2. THERE IS NO FACTUAL BASIS FOR AN IMPLIED-IN-FACT 
CONTRACT 
Even if the statute of limitations for enforcing an implied-in-fact contract had not 
expired (which it had), there is no factual basis to sustain an implied-in-fact contract claim. 
Under Utah law, the elements needed to establish an implied-in-fact contract are: (1) 
Peaden requested D.A. to perform the work; (2) DA. expected Peaden to compensate it for 
the work requested; and (3) Peaden knew or should have known that D.A. expected 
compensation for such work. See Davies v. Olson, 746 P.2d 264 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). 
None of the foregoing elements is satisfied in this case. First, Peaden did not request 
that the work be done. 
Second, D.A.'s president, Steven R. Young, testifies in his affidavit that there was no 
agreement reached with Peaden. He testifies that: 
Riverton City required us to install improvements in the entire 
subdivisions to their current standards (as opposed to the standards in place 
when the subdivision was approved and recorded). Before doing so, we tried 
to contact all of the owners of the other lots to either purchase their lots or 
obtain their agreement to participate in the costs of the improvements. AH of 
the other owners, either before or after the improvements were completed, 
acknowledged the benefit to them of the improvements and agreed either to 
6
 In this action, D.A. asserts unequivocally in Point V of its brief below that "the elements 
of an implied-in-fact contract are present here". (R. 42). Because D.A. contends that such 
a contract existed, no claim for unjust enrichment may be brought as a matter of law. See 
Mann v. American Western Life Ins. Co., 586 P.2d 461, 465 (Utah 1978) ("Recovery in 
quasi contract is not available where there is an express contract covering the subject 
matter of the litigation"); American Towers Owners Association, Inc. v. CCI Mechanical 
Inc., 930 P.2d 1182 (Utah 1996). 
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sell their lots or to participate in the costs on a prorata basis except for the 
owners of eight lots, including those owned by Peaden Gene Peaden. 
(R. 35-36) (emphasis added). The foregoing testimony makes it clear that Peaden did not 
agree to pay for the development costs incurred by D.A.. As such, D.A. could have not 
been led to believe that there was an implied-in-fact contract made between the parties as a 
matter of law. 
Third, D.A. could not have expected Peaden to compensate it without some 
agreement to do so, and Peaden did not know, nor should he have expected, an obligation to 
compensate D.A. for work performed by D.A. for its own purposes so it could promptly 
obtain building permits from Riverton City. (R. 2). This is especially true where D.A. did 
the work without Peaden's consent, participation or involvement therein. 
POINTIX 
D.A.'S CLAIMS ARE BARRED BY DOCTRINES OF 
LACHES, UNCLEAN HANDS AND EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL 
A party seeking equity must do so with clean hands. See LHIW, Inc. v. Dehor'ean, 
753 P.2d 961, 963 (Utah 1988).; Salt Lake County v. Kartchner, 552 P.2d 136, 139 (Utah 
1976); Jacobson v. Jacobson, 557 P.2d 156, 158 (Utah 1976). The doctrine has been 
described as follows: 
No maxim of equity is older or more venerated than 'He who seeks 
redress in a court of equity must come with clean hands.' The very 
foundation of equity is good conscience, and any conduct in connection 
with the matter in controversy, which does not comport with good 
conscience, should preclude any relief being granted to [petitioner]. ... 
Misconduct which will bar relief in a court of equity need not necessarily 
be of such nature as to be punishable as crime or to constitute the basis of 
legal action. Under this maxim, any willful act in regard to the matter 
in litigation, which would be condemned and pronounced wrongful by 
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honest and fair-minded men, will be sufficient to make the hands of the 
applicant unclean.'" 
Dowse v. Kammerman, 246 P.2d 881, 885 (Utah 1952) (Crockett, J., dissenting) 
(emphasis added). 
In the present case, D.A.'s president testifies that D.A. did not commence its 
development activities to sub-division C until November of 1997. (R. 35). 
Assuming that the foregoing testimony is true, D.A. had not commenced any 
development of sub-division C until November 1997. Nevertheless, D.A. recorded a Notice 
of Interest asserting a present claim for such improvements in January of 1997. (R. 28). 
Thus, the Notice of Interest was a wrongful lien which the D.A. knew was wrongful at the 
time it was recorded with the Salt Lake County Recorder. Thus, D.A. does not have clean 
hands and is therefore precluded from asserting a claim for unjust enrichment as a matter of 
law.7 
POINTX 
D.A. FAILED TO COMPLY WITH UTAH LAW 
FOR THE RECOVERY OF IMPROVEMENTS MADE TO LAND 
The Utah Mechanic's Lien Statute, UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-1-1, et seq., sets forth the 
procedure by which a person may file a notice of lien so he can recover for improvements 
made to real property. However, D.A. did not comply with the foregoing Act. 
7
 D.A. is in a no win situation. If it alleges that the incidental improvements were 
made at the time it recorded its improper Notice of Interest on January 10, 1997 against 
Peaden's Property, then the four-year statute of limitations bars its alleged claims. 
Conversely, if D.A. alleges that the alleged improvements were made in 1997, then the 
Notice of Interest, (which is not authorized by law) is clearly a malicious slander of title 
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D.A. does not dispute that the Utah mechanic's lien statute sets forth the proper 
procedure by which a person may record a notice of lien to recover for improvements made 
to land. D.A. also does not dispute that it did not record a notice of lien under Utah 
Mechanic's Lien Statute. Instead, D.A. contends that the Act is inapplicable to its claim. 
However, what D.A. fails to recognize is that under Utah law a person may only record a 
notice of interest if it is allowed by law. Utah law defines a "wrongful lien" as: 
any document that purports to create a lien or encumbrance on an owner's 
interest in certain real property and at the time it is recorded or filed is not: 
(a) expressly authorized by this chapter or another state or 
statutes; or 
(b) authorized by or contained in an order or judgment of a 
court of competent jurisdiction in the state; or 
(c) signed by or authorized pursuant to a document signed by 
the owner of the real property. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-9-1 (1997). 
The facts are undisputed that there is no statute which authorized the recording of the 
Notice of Interest against Peaden's Property. The facts are undisputed that no judgment or 
order was ever entered which authorized D.A. to record a notice of interest against Peaden's 
Property, and the facts are not disputed that the Peaden never signed a document which 
allowed D.A. to record its Notice of Interest against Peaden's Property. D.A. also admitted 
that it did not record its Notice of Interest under the Mechanics' Lien Act, and D.A. has not 
asserted any other statutory basis authorizing the Notice of Interest. Therefore, the Notice of 
to Peaden's Property. Under either scenario, D.A.'s alleged claim fails as a matter of 
law. 
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Interest was a wrongful lien as a matter of law thereby precluding D.A.'s right to assert a 
claim in equity against Peaden or his Property as a matter of law. 
POINT XI 
THE DISTRICT COURT'S FINDING OF GOOD CAUSE 
IS CLEARLY SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD 
There facts are sufficiently clear to support the District Court's finding of "good 
cause" for the dismissal of the action. Indeed, the following fully support the District 
Court's ruling: 
(a) The allegations made in the complaint (which were presumed true); 
(b) The Affidavit of D.A.'s president, Steven R. Young, which sustains the facts 
set forth above in the analysis of facts; 
(c) The certified copy of Notice of Interest, made and recorded by the D.A. on 
January 10, 1997, and the statements and representations made therein; 
(d) The certified copy of Pre-Building Report prepared by Riverton City; 
(e) The facts represented by the D.A. in its pleadings; and 
(f) The representations of facts made by D.A. at the hearings before the Court. 
POINT XII 
THE EXTRINSIC DOCUMENTS WERE 
PROPERLY CONSIDERED BY THE COURT 
D.A. cites two Utah cases (i.e., Mounteer v. Utah Power & Light Co., 823 P.2d 
1055, 1058 (Utah 1991) and Russell v. Standard Corp., 898 P.2d 263, 264 (Utah 1995)) and 
argues that once the District Court decides to consider outside materials, the non-moving 
party should be given an opportunity to respond to those materials. In this case the outside 
materials consisted of D.A.'s own affidavit, a certified copy of its own Notice of Interest 
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and a certified copy of Riverton City's Pre-Building Report. No other outside materials 
were considered by the District Court. The District Court's consideration of these 
documents was indeed proper and D.A.'s objection thereto is unfounded. 
POINT XIII 
THERE IS NO BASIS FOR 
RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT UNDER RULE 60(b) 
There is no basis for relief from the District Court's order under Rule 60(b) of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. For the reasons stated above, this Court's decision was 
based upon the merits of the case, and not upon a two-day delay in the filing of a response 
to Peaden's alternative motion for a more definite statement, which became moot once the 
District Court granted Peaden's motion to dismiss. Moreover, even if the District Court 
should have considered the untimely pleading filed by D.A., its failure to do so is simply 
"harmless error". Utah R. Civ. P. 618 requires the District Court to disregard any error or 
defect in the proceeding which does not affect the substantial rights of the parties. 
Based upon the foregoing, D.A.'s memorandum in opposition to Peaden's alternative 
motion for more definite statement became meaningless after the District Court granted 
Peaden's motion to dismiss, and was properly disregarded by the District Court. 
Rule 61. Harmless error. No error . . . or defect in any ruling or order or in anything 
done or omitted by the court or by any of the parties, is ground for granting a new trial or 
otherwise disturbing a judgment or order, unless refusal to take such action appears to the 
court inconsistent with substantial justice. The court at every stage of the proceeding 
must disregard any error or defect in the proceeding which does not affect the substantial 
rights of the parties. 
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POINT XIV 
THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY TREATED 
THE MOTION AS ONE FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
The District Court did not abuse its discretion in considering matters outside the 
pleadings. UTAH R. Civ. P. 12(b) provides in relevant part as follows: 
If, on a motion asserting the defense numbered (6) to dismiss for 
failure of the pleading to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, 
matters outside the pleading are presented to and not excluded by the court, 
the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as 
provided in Rule 56, and all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to 
present all material made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56. 
In this action, the District did receive and consider the Affidavit of Steven R. Young, 
which D.A. had filed with the Court in opposition to Peaden's motion. The only other 
outside materials considered were D.A.'s Notice of Interest recorded January 10, 1997 and a 
certified copy of the Pre-Building Report from Riverton City. Surely, D.A. cannot 
complain that the Court acted improperly by receiving D.A.'s Affidavit and D.A.'s own 
Notice of Interest which it recorded with the County Recorder. 
POINT XV 
D.A.'s AMENDED COMPLAINT 
FAILED TO STATE A CLAIM FOR RELIEF 
On April 25, 2002, D.A. filed a motion for leave to file an amended complaint, 
(R. 49), together with the proposed amended complaint. (R. 51-55). While the proposed 
amended complaint did not add any new allegations, it alleged the following additional 
claim "[pjlaintiff is entitled to have an equitable lien impressed upon the lots owned by 
defendants to secure payment of the amounts due plaintiff hereunder." (R. 54). 
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The adding of the foregoing sentence to the original complaint does not preclude 
dismissal based upon the ruling of the District Court. The allegations set forth in the 
amended complaint do not state a timely claim for an "equitable lien" under Utah law. In 
addition, the same four-year statute of limitations bars any claim of an alleged equitable 
lien. American Tierra Corp. v. City of West Jordan, 840 P.2d 757, 760 (Utah 1992). 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons the District Court's order dismissing D.A.'s complaint 
should be affirmed as a matter of law. 
DATED this CB*-P day of February, 2004. 
RAY QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
Steven W. Call 
Benjamin J. Kotter 
Attorneys for Appellee Gene Peaden 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * * 
DEVELOPMENT ASSOCIATES, 
INC. , 
Plaintiff, 
vs. * Case No. 020902121 
GENE PEADEN, * 
Defendant. * 
BE IT REMEMBERED that on the 23rd day of 
September, 2002, commencing at the hour of 10:30 a.m., 
the Hearing in the above-entitled matter was held 
at the above-entitled Court, Salt Lake City, Utah. 
This Hearing was electronically recorded. 
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A P P E A R A N C E S 
For t h e P l a i n t i f f RALPH J. MARSH 
Attorney at Law 
68 South Main #800 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
For the Defendant STEVEN W. CALL 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 4 5385 
Salt Lake City, UT 84145 
Judge: WILLIAM B. BOHLING 
* * * * 
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P R O C E E D I N G S 
THE COURT: This is Case No. 020902121. 
Counsel, would you enter your appearances, please? 
MR. MARSH: Ralph Marsh for the Plaintiff. 
MR. CALL: Steven Call on behalf of the 
Defendant, Gene Peaden, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: I'll hear your motion, Counsel. 
MR. CALL: Thank you -- Thank you, Your Honor. 
MR. MARSH: Well, it's my motion. 
MR. CALL: I believe that's correct, the Court 
has dismissed and it's a Motion for Reconsideration, 
so --
THE COURT: Oh, all right. Go ahead, Counsel. 
MR. MARSH: Thank you. It's not correctly 
entitled a Motion for Reconsideration, it is a Motion, 
under Rules 52, 59 and 60, however, to Amend or to 
Amend the Judgment and so on. 
A quick review of the facts, if I may, Your 
Honor. We filed, on behalf of Development Associates, 
a complaint alleging basically a cause of action for 
unjust enrichment. And Mr. Call filed, on behalf of 
his client, a Motion to Dismiss, attaching two 
documents outside of the complaint to his motion. 
The time, as I calculated under Rule, when a 
response to his Motion to Dismiss was due from me was 
DEPOMAX RRPOPTTW; rwr» /^ ni\ muioo 
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1 April 25th. On that day I served on him our response 
2 to that motion. 
3 And I did not recall, until I received the 
4 Court's order, whether I had mailed the original to the 
5 Court or actually delivered it. As it turns out, as I 
6 checked later, I must have mailed it, because the 
7 original did not reach the Court until I believe the 
8 29th. 
9 I -- It was due on Thursday, the 25th, I 
10 mailed it that day apparently, and it reciched the Court 
11 in time to be entered in the Court file the next 
12 Monday. So, by that reckoning, it would have been two 
13 days late, that is a Friday and Monday. 
14 Mr. Call's secretary called me on May 14th and 
15 requested an extension of time to file their reply to 
16 my -- my memo in opposition until Monday the 20th, and 
17 I granted that extension. 
18 And it didn't come on the 20th, but on the 
19 21st she called again and requested another extension 
20 until the 25th of May, which I granted, which is my 
21 practice, whatever they need I usually grant. 
22 And their response -- their reply, however, 
23 was not filed on the 25th, it was actually filed on the 
24 30th of May. So it was late, but that didn't bother 
2 5 me. 
lVJLiuxiT age 
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On June 14th Mr. Call filed a Notice to Submit 
for Decision, indicating that both parties had 
requested oral argument in this matter and referencing 
all of the documents that had been filed, his motion, 
my response and his reply. 
On June 2 6th the Court signed a minute entry 
decision and order which states, before the Court is 
Notice to Submit Defendant's Motion to Dismiss dated 
April 8th, 2002 and Defendant's alternative Motion for 
Definite Statement filed May 30, 2002 and submitted on 
its June 14, 2002 Notice to Submit for Decision. 
Having reviewed all pertinent pleadings and having no 
timely opposition being filed and good files appearing, 
the Motion to Dismiss is granted. This constitutes the 
order of the Court. 
THE COURT: Counsel, just so we can get right 
to the heart of where we're at today, I see this as a 
motion on the merits. 
I'm not going to hold you to the problem, 
that, as a matter of fact, there -- there seem to have 
been other incidences where someone is late, and I'll 
get -- I'll get submitted to me on no response an 
opportunity to rule on it, and I simply do that. 
But if it turns out there's -- that there are 
a couple of days delay and everybody has filed their 
T Y P P r V M T A V D C D n i i T T X T ^ TT^T^ • o ^ - . x ~ ~ -
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MR. MARSH: 
THE COURT: 
fact that you were a 
isn't something that 
to take advantage of 
matter on its merits 
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List vacate that and hear the matter 
so that's where we're at today. 
Okay. I'm --
I'm not going to hold you to the 
couple days late, it certainly 
I think the other side is seeking 
I'm willing to just hear this 
• 
I was going to suggest that if 
that's the Court position this becomes -- or rather it 
becomes more complex 
dismissal for a two 
than it would if it was simply a 
day untimely filing. That would 
make this a very simple matter. 
THE COURT: It would. And if you're prepared 
to proceed on the merits, the Court is as well. On the 
other hand, if you - - if you are unprepared and just 
want to set this again, it's up to you, Mr. Marsh. 
MR. MARSH: On the merits, are you speaking of 
the merits on our Motion to Dismiss? 
THE COURT: 
MR. MARSH: 
THE COURT: 
MR. MARSH: 
and I did not submit 
1 to the Court, nor di 
Yes. 
On their Motion to Dismiss? 
Yes. 
That was not noticed for today, 
courtesy copies of those documents 
d I actually prepare for that 
Mum-rage 
motion, I was simply prepared 
set that aside. 
you're 
submit 
THE COURT: All right 
opposing that; are you, 
MR. CALL: We had opp 
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do think that this was --
the 
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to address our motion 
I don't even 
Counsel? 
osed it, and we 
merits, and I --
substance of the 
were addressed in the memorandum in opposition 
think 
did 
I --
to 
I 
issues 
to 
Motion to Vacate. 
We addressed - - We stated in our opposition to 
his Motion to Vacate that we weren't objecting to any 
of the timeliness issues, but that we address 
specifically the merits of the Court's ruling. 
So I guess it would be my position that the 
merits are before the Court today, because that was --
the only response that we made to his motion was we 
agreed everything is timely, but we -- we agreed that 
the Court can look at the merits and that there's no 
basis for a claim. 
THE COURT: Well, is it -- there has been this 
issue, and, frankly, I wanted to recognize that I 
understand Mr. Marsh's position here, and if you would 
be more comfortable rescheduling, fine, if you want to 
go to the merits, I'm prepared and I think Counsel is. 
MR. MARSH: Well, I believe I can ao tc the 
TX"IT»Tfc^V^ K M "mr 
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1 merits of the motion, in which case that would be Mr. 
2 Call's motion, and he should address it first I 
3 suppose. 
4 MR. CALL: All right. 
5 THE COURT: That's fine. But, again, it's 
6 really your decision, Mr. Marsh. 
7 MR. MARSH: Well, I appreciate that, and does 
8 that clarify things for me, and it means I have merits 
9 to discuss and not -- not the timeliness issue. 
10 THE COURT: All right. 
11 MR. CALL: Giving a little factual background 
12 I think is appropriate. This is a lawsuit that the 
13 Plaintiff, Development Associates, has filed against 
14 the Peadens. 
15 The Peadens owned six lots in a development, a 
16 rather large development in Riverton City. Originally, 
17 the developer was a company by the name of Bagley 
18 Development. 
19 Bagley had gone to Riverton City, had 
20 undertaken this development, had posted the appropriate 
21 bond to comply with the development process, and in 
22 that process sold six lots to the Peadens. 
23 After the lots were sold, the developer, 
24 Bagley, apparently became in financial woes and 
25 borrowed some money in order to tender the property 
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taxes owing on these hundreds of lots to the County. 
Money was borrowed from Mortgage Investment, 
Inc., and, thereafter, Bagley defaulted on the money 
that it borrowed to pay the taxes. And the property 
went into foreclosure and was purchased by the lender, 
Mortgage Investment, Inc. 
Thereafter, the property was conveyed to the 
Plaintiff in this action, Development Associates. For 
whatever reason, the bond that had been pledged for the 
development was lost or became unenforceable, and so 
this development remained in its state at that period 
of time. 
Sometime thereafter, after Development 
Associates purchased this property, which we believe 
was for a very nominal sum, there were some 
conversations that occurred between the President of 
the company and the Peadens. 
And the President of Development Associates, 
as represented in his affidavit, indicated that he had 
contacted many of the lot owners and had inquired 
whether they were willing to immediately assist with 
the development cost that the Plaintiff wanted to 
undertake in its own designs and fashions. And except 
for approximately eight different lot owners, some of 
1 them agreed to participate to a certain extent. 
1YXU1LJL X O g k / 
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The Peadens indicated that no, this isn't a 
good time for us, we're not interested in developing 
the lots immediately, we weren't required to do that, 
we're holding these lots for our own purpose, and made 
it clear that they were not willing to participate with 
the developer in making further developments to the 
development itself. 
After that occurred, the Plaintiff attempted 
to move forward with some development and Riverton City 
explained to them, you can't do that, we're not going 
to let you come in here. 
And the Plaintiff, I believe the record 
reflects, owns approximately 400 of the 556 lots, went 
to Riverton City attempting to get building permits and 
other permits to move forward with the development of 
their lots. 
Riverton City responded and said, no, you 
can't do that, you can't do that, we're not going to 
allow you to move forward on a partial basis, you're 
going to have to make these improvements in order to 
move forward. 
The Plaintiff, obviously, because in acquiring 
this property in a foreclosure type method, had 
intended to move forward at that time, knew the 
25 1 circumstances when it got involved with the property; 
ivxuiu-rage 
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went forward with some development of the property, and 
dealt with Riverton City in order to obtain the 
necessary permits. 
In obtaining the permits, the Plaintiff 
proceeded to make improvements on the development. 
After many of the improvements had been made, and there 
are three primary plats that were involved, three of 
Mr. Peaden's lots were in Plat B, three were in Plat C. 
They undertook Plat -- the development of Plat 
B first, made some improvements to that plat, and then 
also undertook some heavier development in Plat C. In 
1993, before the developments occurred, Mr. Peaden had 
sold one of his lots or conveyed one of his lots to his 
son. So, long before the developments occurred, he 
only then held five lots, three in Plat B and two in 
Plat C. 
The Plaintiff moved forward with the 
development, Your Honor, and after the improvements 
were substantially completed in Plat B, the Plaintiff 
then went to the County Recorder and filed a formal 
Notice of Claim -- or Notice of Interest, on all of the 
Peaden's property. 
The Notice of Interest, which is attached as 
Exhibit B, states, that the undersigned, Development 
Associates, hereby claims and asserts an interest in 
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subject property pursuant to their improvements and 
developments, which benefit the following described 
property. 
And they proceed to list all of the lots in 
the three plats. That was recorded with the Salt Lake 
County Recorder on January the 10th, 1997. We believe, 
and we've attached for the Court a copy of that, and I 
think it's unambiguous that that is a present claim 
that has been asserted, or a Notice of Interest that 
has been asserted with respect to that property. 
It is our position, Your Honor, that that 
claim constituted the triggering point for the statutes 
of limitations with respect to the claims that have 
been asserted by Development Associates. 
In its complaint, Development Associates 
asserts that it is entitled to recover from the Peadens 
primarily on two claims for relief; one, that there 
must have been an implied contract between the parties 
that the Peadens would pay for a portion of the 
development, thus, an implied in contract claim --
implied in fact claim, even though it's undisputed 
between the parties that there -- that there was no 
written agreement or oral agreement between the 
parties, there is a claim stated in the complaint that I 
1 there was an implied in fact contract, which led up tc 
muiii-rage 
the filing of the Notice of Claim that was 
January of 1997. 
The second claim for re lief is 
Page 13 
filed m 
that the 
Plaintiff is asserting that it has conveyed an unjust 
enrichment upon the Defendants, 
do development work not on their 
specifically, though there were 
put on their lots, we're talking 
that are made to the development 
sewer, the water, the fire, the 
because 
proper 
it undertook to 
ties 
some stubs 
about 
that were 
improvements 
, and that 
grading of 
is the 
the roads 
and what have you. 
With respect to both of those claims, Your 
Honor, we have asserted that they are both barred by 
the applicable statute of limitations. 
Title 78, Section -- Chapter 12, Section 25 
states that an action to be brought upon a contract 
that is not founded in writing or brought anothei claim 
that's based upon an oral assertion, must be brought 
within four years. 
In this circumstance the claim that was 
asserted was that the parties have been unjustly 
enriched. The Utah Supreme Court has held that the 
unjust enrichment claim is a four year claim governed 
by that applicable statute of limitations. The action 
m this case was not filed until March of this vear. 
Multi-Page'' 
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Thus, the claim that was asserted, which was 
in January of 1997, was more than five years old 
before the action in this case was brought. Thus, it's 
the P 
subst 
eaden's position, without even reaching the 
ance of the claim itself, that it is barred by the 
statute of limitations. 
Secondly, with respect to the lot --' the 
improvements that were made in Lots 379 and 555, which 
were 
those 
those 
the two lots in Plat C, we are also asserting that 
are barred by the statute of limitations, because 
lots were also included in the formal claim that 
was asserted and recorded with the County Recorder. 
there 
Again, the argument is, Your Honor, that if 
is a significant claim that exists, such that the 
Plaintiffs were -- the Plaintiff was entitled to file 
such 
claim 
made 
a claim with the County Recorder, then surely its 
would have accrued at that time. 
It's undisputed that the Peadens have never 
any payments to the Plaintiff under any sort of 
contract or under any sort of claim in equity. They 
have 
that 
always rejected and refuted any sort of assertion 
they were obligated to make any such payment. 
As such, if the Plaintiff was seeking to sue 
in equity or on an implied in fact contract, it must 
1 have done so before January 10th of 2001. 
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1 Indeed, even if we admit that there is an 
2 implied in fact contract that existed before the claim 
3 was filed with the County Recorder, thereby justifying 
4 the filing of the claim, that would also establish a 
5 triggering date before January 10th, 1997, thereby 
6 requiring any cause of action to be brought on or 
7 before January 10th of the year 2001. 
8 Again, the complaint that was filed in this 
9 action by the Plaintiff wasn't filed not in January of 
10 2001, nor in January of 2002, but in March of 2002. 
11 And, therefore, any claim, based upon an implied in 
12 fact contract, is also barred by the statute of 
13 limitations. 
14 In the original complaint that was filed, it 
15 was suggested that there were some basis for an implied 
16 in fact contract, that the Peadens had implied that 
17 they would make payment for some of these improvements. 
18 However, later on the President of the 
19 company, Mr. Steve Young, filed his sworn affidavit. 
20 And in that sworn affidavit, he makes it absolutely 
21 clear that there was no such agreement. 
22 He states, in paragraph 6 of his affidavit, 
23 that -- and I'd like to read this, if I could, 
24 "Riverton City required us to install improvements in 
25 the entire subdivisions to th^ir mv-rem*- ,-.+-^-*3-~-= -
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opposed to the standards in place when the subdivision 
was approved and recorded. 
Before doing so, we tried to contact all of 
the owners of the other lots to either purchase their 
lots or obtain their agreements to participate in the 
costs of the improvements. 
All of the other owners, either before or 
after the improvements were completed, acknowledged the 
benefit to them of the improvements and agreed either 
to sell their lots or to participate in the cause on a 
prorata basis, except for the owners of the eight lots, 
including those owned by Defendant Peaden." So he 
clarifies that they never agreed to such a 
circumstance. 
Because of that, we don't believe that there 
are even facts that would sustain an implied in fact 
contract even had the statute of limitations not run on 
January 10th, 1997. 
And we do that, not based upon Mr. Peaden's 
affidavit, which, if called to testify, would testify 
as Mr. Young has testified, that they had no agreement 
or understanding between them with respect to that. 
In fact, Mr. Peaden expressly rejected the 
suggestion that he participate. Mr. Peaden was 
1 somewhat offended, Your Honor, that someone would come 
Multi-Page1 
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to him and say, you either sell your lot to us for 
$3,000 or we're going to make the improvements and sue 
you. 
That doesn't seem appropriate. It seems to me 
that if you buy a lot and you hold it as an investment, 
that you shouldn't be held at ransom to conform with 
the demands of a majority lot owner simply because he 
has a separate timetable and desires to make his 
improvements before yours are made. 
As this Court knows, there is a statutory 
scheme set forth in Title 38 that sets forth a matter 
in which a person or a company that makes improvements 
to real property may assert a claim. 
It's the mechanic's lien statute, it deals 
with the rights of owners or subcontractors who improve 
property, it sets out a specific manner in which a 
notice of lien is recorded with the County Recorder, it 
sets forth specific statutes of limitations and rights 
of the property owner and the subcontractor that 
provides those benefits. 
That is the remedy that should be followed if 
a subcontractor or a person conveying a benefit to land 
believes that he is entitled to a lien for some amount 
must satisfy that statute. 
The facts are undisputed that nothing was done 
Miuti-rage 
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with respect to that statute, there was no notice of 
lien filed under Title 38, there has been no 
subcontractor's lien, there have been none of the 
notices filed or served, as required by that statute. 
There was no foreclosure action brought under that 
subchapter for closure within the one year period, as 
required by that section. And that's undisputed. 
We're not to suggest that there may not be a remedy 
in certain circumstances for subcontractors, because 
that happens frequently, and I'm sure the Court has 
addressed some of those claims. There was no such 
claim brought under Title 38, and there is no basis for 
it. 
Finally, with respect to the claim of unjust 
enrichment, even if the statute of limitations had not 
run on all of these claims, Your Honor, the law appears 
rather clear in Utah that a claim of unjust enrichment 
does not exist when a party conveys an indirect benefit 
on a neighbor. 
And, if I may approach. Your Honor, the Utah 
Supreme Court has adopted the restitution -- or the 
restatement of restitution in Utah with respect to 
causes of action and equity, which would include a 
claim for unjust enrichment. 
Part of that restitution that's been adopted 
Mum-rage 
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by the Supreme Court is Section 106. It addressed --
Long before any of us were upon this earth, they 
addressed this document when they codified the doctrine 
of restatement of restitution. 
And they wanted to make it clear that even 
though in certain circumstances a party could recover a 
claim for unjust enrichment, that under no circumstance 
would a party be able to use that to coerce a third 
party who refuses to participate in some cost to be 
sued under that doctrine. 
Section 106 reads; a person, who incidentally 
to the performance of his own duty, or to the 
protection or the improvement of his own things, has 
conferred a benefit upon another, is not, thereby, 
entitled to contribution. 
Then it comes down and makes it absolutely 
clear, and makes three illustrations. Illustration 
one, A, the owner of land on a riverbank, reasonably 
fearing immediate inundation, requests his neighbor, B, 
to join in the building of a dike, which will preserve 
the land of both. B refuses. 
A builds the dike, which saves both pieces of 
land from being flooded. Result: A is not entitled to 
contribution from B. Example two, A and B are 
adjoining landowners whose lines have been flooded by 
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from a nearby swamp. 
ts B to join him in draining the 
A drains the swamp, thereby drying 
It: He is not entitled to 
B. Same facts as illustration two, 
contracted to keep water out of A's 
mine, and he drains the mine - - o r drains the swamp in 
performance of his duty to A. Result: C is not 
entitled to contr 
The same 
have a party who 
ibution from B. 
result occurs here, Your Honor. We 
purchased through a foreclosure 
process 400 of some 500 lots. Because of the quantity 
of its ownership, 
undertake certain 
but for their own 
the City required that the Plaintiff 
development, not for the Defendants, 
efforts. 
In performing those duties, the Defendants 
have received an 
agree to pay for 
in any way. 
And, as 
or claim in unjus 
incidental benefit. And it didn't 
those, it didn't mislead the Plaintiff 
a result, the Plaintiff has no right 
t enrichment. It's benefits were --
It's benefits were beneficial. And the Plaintiff knew 
that they had rej 
pay or contribute 
1 ^ r N n r n v Q m D n i " Q W O T © 
ected any suggestion that they would 
to those benefits before the 
pver made. 
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1 Based upon that, Your Honor, we have moved the 
2 Court to dismiss the action that has been brought 
3 against the Peadens on grounds that it's barred by the 
4 statute of limitations, that there are no facts 
5 (inaudible) implied in that contract, if there were, 
6 they were barred by the statute of limitations, that 
7 there is no claim in equity against the Peadens under 
8 these circumstances. 
9 And, finally, Your Honor, I think you're well 
10 aware that in Courts of equity a party may never 
11 approach a Court and ask for equitable unjust 
12 enrichment or some other equitable claim unless they 
13 have clean hands. 
14 And in this case the Plaintiff went in and 
15 intentionally filed a Notice of Interest with the 
16 County Recorder, placing (inaudible) or a lien upon all 
17 of our property. 
18 And then later testifying, in his sworn 
19 affidavit, Mr. Young says, oh, we hadn't done anything 
20 at that time. Our improvements were made in 1998, such 
21 as to bring them within the four year statute. 
22 I assert to the Court that even if that were 
23 true, and even if the improvements were not made until 
24 1998, the fact that the Plaintiff went in and 
25 intentionally filed that Nntirp O-F m -^; ~ _.--.--•— -
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a claim against the Peaden's 
property, knowing that it was false, is not clean 
hands, and, 
right at thi 
as such, 
s point 
with that, Your Hono 
dismiss the 
THE 
MR. 
with that. 
Mr. Call is 
clean hands 
The 
Development 
voluntarily, 
Lake County 
action. 
COURT: 
MARSH: 
the Plaintiff has no standing or 
to assert a claim in equity. And 
r, we would pray the Court to 
Thank you, Counsel. Mr. Marsh. 
I'm not quite sure how to begin 
But, just to respond to that last point, 
claiming 
in this 
that Development Associates has no 
situation. 
Court needs to understand that what 
Associates did here, and not -- that wasn't 
but because they were forced to by Salt 
and the 
to develop the lots 
The 
them not to 
improvements 
three of tho 
150 of those 
The 
Mr. Young's 
coverage, an 
County 
develop 
City of Riverton. They brought it 
which they owned. 
and the City of Riverton required 
their own lots, but to put in the 
that would improve all of the lots in all 
se subdivisions, 556 lots total, and 100 to 
lots th 
re is in 
affidavi 
Ld we' ve 
1 t-hat wprc owned, and 
key did not own. 
L the file, Your Honor, a copy of 
t, which has a copy of the plats 
marked in yellow there the ones 
I vou can see there's a checkerboard 
TM Multi-Page 
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1 pattern. 
2 It was impossible to go in and improve just 
3 the lots that are owned by Development Associates 
4 without also improving the neighboring lots, absolutely 
5 impossible. 
6 In the process of improving those lots, the 
7 cost per lot turned out to be somewhere between $13,000 
8 and $17,000 per lot, depending on the location. That's 
9 a substantial sum of money that was expended in 
10 improving lots that Development Associates did not own. 
11 The value of those lots before Development 
12 Associates stepped in was approximately $500 per lot, 
13 and that could be established by sales of those lots at 
14 that point in time. The value of those lots today is 
15 over $50,000 per lot, only because of the improvements 
16 that Development Associates put in. 
17 To suggest that they don't have clean hands 
18 after having handed Mr. Peaden a value of $45,000 to 
19 $50,000 per lot, I think is somewhat ridiculous. 
20 And let me go back and talk a little about the 
21 history --
22 THE COURT: Well, if I understand his 
23 argument, isn't the -- isn't this conferred benefit, 
24 but the argument is that you filed a Notice of Claim 
25 before you had any -- had actually r-n-nfo^ ->-o^  ^,. 
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benefit at all, whatever your legal position is on the 
benefit? 
MR. MARSH: And that's the harm that we did 
here? 
THE COURT: If I understood him right. 
MR. MARSH: If that's what he's claiming, he 
has not shown any harm resulting from the filing of 
that Notice of Interest. And let me give a little 
history on that too, if I may. 
And a lot of this history, you know, may be of 
interest of the Court and may be helpful to the Court, 
although it doesn't appear in the complaint, and, of 
course, in our Motion to Dismiss, it is the facts 
asserted in the complaint which are taken for truth. 
Development Associates did not foreclose on these 
lots, they actually purchased these lots from somebody 
else and paid a substantial sum for them. They 
initially went to Salt Lake County -- Well, let me back 
up. 
Owners of these lots, which have not been 
developed, have often gone to Salt Lake County and 
says, we want to get building permits. The County 
says, sorry, we can't help you, there's nothing we can 
do, there's no improvements out there, we will not let 
1 vou build. 
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1 Well, how do we solve this problem? The 
2 County and staff people said, we don't know. 
3 Development Associates came in and said, there are 550 
4 lots out there that people own, there must be a way to 
5 solve this problem. 
6 Initially, they went to the County and said, 
7 can we form a special improvement district that would 
8 include all of these lots, have that district put in 
9 all of the improvements, and then have that district 
10 assess each lot for the prorata cost of those 
11 improvements. 
12 Therefore, each owner would have had to pay, 
13 not necessarily in cash, but over -- assessments 
14 probably over a ten year period of time the cost of 
15 those improvements to reimburse the special improvement 
16 district. 
17 The County went through a process for over a 
18 year trying to set that up, and it ultimately was 
19 determined not feasible, because the County wouldn't 
20 approve it without some pledging of other assets by 
21 Development Associates, and it was ultimately 
22 determined the cost to do that through the County would 
23 be more than it could be done privately. 
24 So Development Associates decided, well, we 
Salt 
Lake 
said 
lots 
in, 
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Lake County. The lots, by the way, were in Salt 
County at that point in time. And the County 
, we will allow you to go ahead and improve those 
, but you must improve every one. 
At that point in time, Riverton City stepped 
and because of the nearness of these lots to 
Riverton City, they wanted to annex this property into 
Riverton City, and that happened, and so Riverton City 
took 
all 
were 
over the process from Salt Lake County. 
And Riverton City also said, you must improve 
of the lots, and not just to the standards that 
in place at the time these lots were first 
approved back in 1980, but to our current standards, 
whic h increased the cost per lot that had to be 
expended to improve these lots. 
then 
the 
will 
shar 
way 
150 
At that point in time, Development Associates 
approached the owners of all the other lots with 
proposal that we're willing to buy your lot, we 
agree with you -- or have you agree with us to 
e some of these expenses, or let's find some other 
to make it work. 
And every other lot owner out of that 100 to 
that were not owned by Development Associates, 
ultimately agreed to that solution, and. either sold the 
1 lots to Development Associates or they agreed to 
npjpnMAY ttPTPfwrrwr^ ixir1 ^ n n ^9£-i ICE 
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participate in the costs. 
And I should say there was a prior lawsuit 
against one of those owners, and after that lawsuit was 
filed, some 30 or 40 other lot owners joined in that 
suit, and we ended up settling that suit by accepting 
payment from those other owners for a portion of their 
costs of development. 
We're down to the part where Mr. Peaden is the 
only one -- I shouldn't say that. He had one lot that 
he conveyed to a son, and that son participated in that 
settlement. And so, in that sense, he was a part of 
that settlement. These few lots he held out of that 
settlement, and I'm not sure why. 
The -- It is true that Mr. Peaden did not 
agree up front to pay the cost -- his share of the 
cost, but it is true that when he was contacted he 
acknowledged the need for those improvements to be put 
in, he knew that his lot was essentially worthless 
without them, and he encouraged Development Associates 
to proceed with those improvements. 
Now, that's a fact which is in the complaint, 
it's in Mr. Young's affidavit, which must be taken as 
true for purposes of this motion. And that's all that 
is required for unjust enrichment in the state of Utah. 
He knows the benefit that is beincr conferred on him, 
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1 and he encourages them to proceed, then he is subject 
2 I to a claim for unjust enrichment. 
3 Development Associates went ahead, expended 
4 literally millions of dollars improving the lots in 
5 Subdivision A, then B, and then C. And while Mr. Call 
6 has got a restatement for his authority, there are 
7 numerous cases in the state of Utah which -- which 
8 define what constitutes unjust enrichment. 
9 And there are some cases in the Court of 
10 Appeals which go into some detail about what 
11 constitutes unjust enrichment. 
12 In fact, the case of Davies vs. Olson goes 
13 into great detail and says that there are two branches, 
14 and one of those branches, which they refer to as quasi 
15 contract, which, by the way, is different from implied 
16 contract, quasi contract -- the elements of a quasi 
17 contract the Court of Appeals says is, a contract 
18 implied in law are, the Defendant receive the benefit, 
19 which is true in this case, two, an appreciation or 
20 knowledge by the Defendant of that benefit, which is 
21 true in this case, he knows that his lot was improved 
22 and the value was increased by $45,000 or more, and, 
23 three, under the circumstances it would make it unjust 
24 for the Defendant to retain the benefit without paying 
25 for it. 
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THE COURT: Isn't there another element that 
2 I the Defendant requested the Plaintiff to perform the 
3 I work? 
MR. MARSH: In -- In this Davis vs. Olson 
5 I case, the Court of Appeals states, there are two 
6 branches of this area of the law called (inaudible). 
7 The first credential is the one I just referred to, 
8 which they call a quasi contract. 
9 In the second branch, they say that is a 
10 contract implied in fact as opposed to a contract 
11 implied in law. And the elements there -- these are 
12 all stated on page 6 by way of our Memorandum in 
13 Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss, and that will be 
14 in the file and not a courtesy copy. 
15 But that -- that branch of (inaudible) has 
16 elements that are, one, the Defendant requested the 
17 Plaintiff to perform the work, and I think that's what 
18 the Court has referenced here, two, the Plaintiff 
19 expected the Defendant to compensate him or her for 
20 those services, and, three, the Defendant knew or 
21 should have kno wn that the Plaintiff expected 
22 compensation. 
23 THE COURT: All right. 
24 MR. MARSH: So, there are two different 
25 I branches and one of them recruires of the Defendant s 
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request that the other branch does not require. 
Now, I should point out that the Utah Supreme 
Court, both before and after the Davies vs. Olson case 
in 1987, has stated the elements of (inaudible) 
somewhat differently. 
In fact, in the most recent case, Jeffs vs. 
Stubbs, a 1988 case -- 1990 case, I'm sorry, and this 
is referred to on page 7 of our memo, the Court stated, 
first the facts underlined in an unjust enrichment 
claim are often complex and vary greatly from case to 
case. 
Indeed, by it's very nature, the unjust 
enrichment doctrine developed to handle fact situations 
that did not fit within a particular legal standard, 
but which, nonetheless, merited judicial intervention. 
They go on to state that the remedy of 
restitution is not confined to any particu] 
circumstance or set of f acts, it is rather 
.ar 
a 
equitable remedy available whenever the Court 
that the Defendant, upon 
is obliged, by the ties 
to make compensation for 
In other words, 
the circumstances 
of natural justice 
benefits received. 
the 
staying with a very flexible, 
1 unjust enrichment situat ions 
of 
flexible, 
finds 
the case, 
and equity, 
Utah Supreme Cou 
unfixed standar 
meaning that we 
rt is 
d in 
don't 
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have to comply necessarily with all of those elements 
set forth in the Court of Appeals decision. 
They say a Court need not find that the 
Defendant intended to compensate the Plaintiff for the 
services rendered, only that the Plaintiff intended 
that the Defendant be a party to make compensation. 
This is because the duty to compensate for unjust 
enrichment is an obligation implied by law without 
reference to the intention of the parties, it's implied 
by law. 
What is important is that it be shown that it 
was not intended or expected that the service be 
rendered for benefit conferred gratuitously, and that 
the benefit was not conferred officiously. 
And then it goes on to say what is meant by 
gratuitously and officiousness. Officiousness means 
interference in the affairs of another not justified by 
the circumstances under which the interference takes 
place. 
I suggest that Mr. Peaden knew that these 
improvements had to be done and he encouraged the 
Development Associates people to go ahead, that that 
was not officiousness for them to proceed to develop 
those lots and improve his lot along with the rest of 
the lots in those subdivisions. 
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You've alleged that in the 
complaint, but is there any affidavit to sustain that 
argument? 
MR. 
THE 
MR. 
THE 
MR. 
MARSH: 
COURT: 
MARSH: 
COURT: 
MARSH: 
point out the fact 
under (inaud. ible), 
But Mr. Young's aff 
THE COURT: 
relying on matters 
seems to me 1 
Judgment. 
MR. 
I'm relying < 
The fact that he --
He encouraged them to do it? 
Yes. Mr. Young's affidavit --
What paragraph? 
Let me find it. And I should 
that it's in with the claim, and 
it's supposed to be taken as true. 
idavit, nevertheless, states --
I think -- I think you're both 
outside of the pleadings, so it 
this really becomes a Motion for Summary 
MARSH: 
on the 
Well, with respect to that item, 
allegation in the complaint, 
paragraph seven, which says, Defendant acknowledged the 
need to install sue 
improvements 
of the lots < 
Plaintiff to 
improvements 
as true. 
I MR. 
would 
,h improvements, and that such 
benefit him and increase the value 
Dwned by him, and encouraged and requested 
procee 
, there 
CALL: 
id with the installation of such 
\ our Motion to Dismiss must be taken 
If I could ]ust interrupt I don':: 
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what that paragraph says, I think the 
quote is misread. 
MR. 
MR. 
MARSH: 
CALL: 
request in that par 
MR. 
MR. 
MR. 
MARSH: 
CALL : 
MARSH: 
The quote 
Doing so and encouraged, there's no 
agraph. 
I didn't say request. 
Said encouraged and requested. 
I'm reading from paragraph seven, 
which one are you reading from? 
MR. CALL : 
affidavit that you 
MR. 
I'm sorry. 
MR. 
affidavit. 
MR. 
that is what 
MARSH: 
CALL: 
MARSH: 
must b 
the motion itself. 
THE 
affidavit wh. 
response to i 
COURT: 
ich is 
an affi 
upon that complaint 
own affidavit. 
MR. 
1 THE 
MARSH: 
COURT: 
I'm reading paragraph seven of his 
read. 
I'm -- I'm reading the complaint, 
Oh, I thought you were citing his 
I'm reading the complaint, because 
e taken as the truth 
I'm wondering if --
for purposes of 
- if you file an 
inconsistent with your complaint in 
davit, I'm wondering 
or if I'm forced to 
What --
Paragraph seven in 
if I can rely 
rely upon your 
the affidavit 
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Page 3^  
reads, Mr. Peaden was also contacted and acknowledged 
the 
to h 
the 
affi 
don' 
need to install such improvements and the benefit 
Lim by doing so, and encouraged us to proceed with 
installation of such improvements. That's your 
davit; right? 
MR. MARSH: That's --
THE COURT: That's --
MR. MARSH: -- Mr. Young's affidavit, but I 
t believe that's inconsistent with what I just read 
from the complaint. 
If I may read that again, Defendant 
acknowledged the need to install such improvements, and 
that 
the 
and 
. such improvements would benefit him and increase 
value of the lots owned by him, and encouraged --
it does say requested - - but that he did encourage 
Plaintiff to proceed. 
affi 
So the requested is the only difference in the 
.davit and -- and the complaint. The bottom line of 
that is that Development Associates was not 
(inaudible), because they did not interfere in his 
affairs if they proceeded to do something which he 
acknowledged would be of benefit to them, which he 
encouraged them to go ahead and do because he knew it 
would benefit him. 
And I was going to read from the Jeffs vs. 
Multi-Page' 
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Stubbs case the definition of gratuitously. It says, 
one renders services gratuitously if at the time they 
were rendered there was no expectation of a return 
benefit, compensation or consideration. Development 
Associates certainly expected to be compensated for the 
benefit they were conferring upon Mr. Peaden. 
Now, if I could jump to Mr. Call's claim of 
why the statute of limitation applies, because that's 
really the only issue before the Court, his Motion to 
Dismiss, because he said the statute of limitations had 
expired. 
Ordinarily, the statute of limitations is an 
affirmative defense which you assert in your answer, 
and then you get into discovery and determine whether 
or not there's some facts that support that. 
Rather, he attached to his motion two 
documents, which are matters outside the complaint, 
one, the Notice of Interest, which was recorded, and, 
second, the report from the City of Riverton. 
The report from the City of Riverton applied 
only to Plat B, had no reference to anything in Plat C, 
so would not have any effect with respect to those 
lots. Furthermore, it stated expressly that the 
improvements were not complete at the time that report 
was issued. 
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In fact, Mr. Young's affidavit goes on to 
state the improvements were installed long after that 
date 
been 
And, in fact, some improvements have not yet 
installed, because they need to be completed under 
the bond filed with the City of Riverton. 
most 
Plat 
Notice of Interest, upon which Mr. Call relies 
heavily, was filed at the time the improvements in 
A were installed, and -- and they did record it 
against the lots in Plats A, B and C, even though they 
have 
when 
not yet commenced the improvements in B and C. 
Nowhere in that notice does it give any date as to 
improvements were installed or completed. And for 
Mr. Call to rely upon that notice as the document which 
says 
date 
the statute of limitations began to run on this 
I think is totally improper. 
That's why Mr. Young filed his affidavit 
saying, we were installing improvements m those plats 
long after that notice of interest was filed. That 
notice wasn't filed to state when -- the dates when 
improvements were installed, it was simply to put other 
owners on notice that they were proceeding to do work 
with in that subdivision. 
Mr. Call also argued that the mechanic's lien 
statute hasn't been complied with. We have made no 
claim under the mechanic's lien statute, haven' r 
Multi-Page 
attempted to make any claiir i under that statute. 
We are simply asserting that this is a 
of unjust enrichment which requires one who has 
received a benefit, knew about the benefit and, 
circumstances where equity 
that benefit, to do so. 
requires that he pay 
The elements of unjust enrichment are 
simple. He's acknowledged 
he has lots that are worth 
sell them for that amount. 
THE COURT: Well, 
the benefit to him, 
Page 37 
matter 
under 
for 
that 
he knows 
$5 0,0 00 today, he can go 
what if -- if a person owns 
some lots that are there being held for investment and 
a developer comes in and decides, well, I'm going to 
develop all this, and some governmental authority tells 
the developer he has to do certain things in order to 
do the development, and so the developer, with that 
choice, decides to proceed, what is it that -- where's 
the equity that requires this person holding it for 
investment to accept whatever this developer decides is 
the developer's time table on this thing? Why is there 
any equity at all in that? 
Your developer didn't do it to confer a 
benefit on him, he did it to confer a benefit on 
himself, it was a cost of doing business. If he -- If 
he had decided it was not in his interest to do ±z, Mr. 
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would have been -- his interest would have 
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been 
r of complete and total indifference to him. 
MR. MARSH: Well, the Court states that, 
mply is not true. If Mr. Peaden were to s 
say, I did not want a lot that I could bui 
, I simply wanted a little 150 by 50 foot 
could put a cow on or grow some vegetables 
you know, that would be one matter. 
lots. 
expecte 
so that 
happen. 
but 
tand 
Id a 
lot 
on, 
He bought those as residential subdivision 
And when he bought them back in 1980 or '82, he 
d that improvements would be put on those 
he would have a buildable lot. That didn 
Development Associates comes along years 
and cures that problem for him. He knows that he 
being b 
want to 
my life 
wanted 
payment 
$50,000 
enefitted, he doesn't want to sit and say, 
keep these as agricultural lots for the r 
, that simply was not in his mind at all, 
subdivision lots. 
He has come forward now to try and avoid 
of this because he knows he can sell them 
lots 
' t 
later 
' s 
I 
est of 
he 
for 
as residential lots. He could not sell them 
for anywhere near that without the improvements that 
have been installed for his benefit. 
Development Associates didn't want to do than , 
Multi-Pagel 
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they were forced by the City of Riverton to do it, or 
you can't develop your lots, because they were tired of 
having people like Mr. Peaden come to them and say, I 
want a building permit, and having to say, no, you 
can't do it because there are no improvements there. 
Development Associates cured the problem for all 
of these people, including Mr. Peaden. It just doesn't 
make sense to say that they stepped in and forced him 
to take a developed lot when that's what he wanted from 
the very first day he bought the lot. They've 
given him what he wanted, they've done what he knew had 
to be done, they've done what he encouraged them to do, 
because he knew that that would benefit him. Now, he 
simply doesn't want to pay for that benefit. 
All we're asking for is that he does, like all 
of the other lot owners out there who have received 
that benefit, that he chip in and pay his share. 
That's not inequitable. In fact, equity requires that 
he do that. That's simply all we're asking, Your 
Honor. 
THE COURT: Thank you, Counsel. Mr. Call. 
MR. CALL: I know you're running late on time, 
and I will make this quick, Your Honor. It is 
unequivocable. Based on the numbers that Mr. Marsh has 
presented to the Court, it would appear to me that 
Multi-PageT 
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1 Development Associates has made $14,000,000. 
2 If they went in there and did the developments 
3 on these lots for $15,000 a lot and they own 400 of 
4 those lots and they're now worth $50,000 a piece, then 
5 they've had over $14,000 -- or $14,000,000 in profit. 
6 As Counsel indicated to the Court, which we 
7 think is dispositive in part, and one our alternative 
8 theories is that the improvements could not be made 
9 without making the improvements. 
10 That is -- That is what an indirect benefit 
11 is. It isn't a situation like Davies vs. Olson, which 
12 I have here, where what happened in that case, the 
13 builder came in and built four duplexes on a piece of 
14 property owned by the owner, and their land sale --or 
15 that the agreement between them failed, and he turned 
16 and sued the owner and said, well, gee, you've got to 
17 give me something for all this work that I've done to 
18 your property. That's a completely different scenario. 
19 In our circumstance we have an indirect 
20 benefit, which has been acknowledged, that they did it 
21 only because the City required them to do it, and they 
22 did it for their own interest. 
23 There's no question that in a restatement of 
24 restitution that I provided to the Court it makes it 
25 clear that -- it savs m example one, it says, E 
Multi-Page™ 
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1 I refuses to pay -- or B refuses, A builds a dike and 
2 saves both pieces of land from being flooded. 
3 The second one is it saved the other property 
4 from being drained. So the mere fact that there's a 
5 benefit conferred upon the Peadens isn't the test, the 
6 test is was did they -- were they unjustly enriched to 
7 the detriment of the Plaintiff, and that's just simply 
8 I not the case. 
The Plaintiff did what -- what it chose to do 
10 I for its own benefit, and it's benefitted tremendously 
11 from that. 
12 I think it would be a terrible policy for the 
13 Court to suggest that if someone in a development or a 
14 neighborhood makes some improvement to a road or to 
15 some property that they feel improves the neighbor's 
16 land, that somehow that -- that will sustain a cause of 
17 action upon that neighbor because he has received some 
18 implied benefit. 
19 These benefits that have been asserted to the 
20 Court aren't benefits that went on their ground, these 
21 are benefits that went in the development. And there 
22 are other matters that -- benefits that Development 
23 Associates received in dealing with the City. 
24 It's my understanding that they were given 
25 property in other thincrs . They've Hnno vpn? woi ^  •;-n 
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But, notwithstanding that, Your 
the matter is is that the statute of 
limitations has run on that. 
The claim 
lien statute, and 
wrongful 
create a 
-- Utah has a wrongful -- a wrongful 
it states that you may not file - - a 
lien means any document that purports to 
lien or encumbrance on an owner's interest in 
certain real property at the time it is recorded or 
filed that is not 
referring to Title 
order or judgment 
expressly authorized by this chapter, 
38, or authorized or contained in an 
of a court of competent jurisdiction 
in the state, or signed by or authorized pursuant to a 
document signed by the owner of the property. 
The Plaintiff didn't have a judgment that 
authorized the recording of such a notice of interest 
or lien, he didn't 
provision that he' 
is none, that he's 
do it based on any statutory 
s referred to anywhere, because there 
acknowledged that they didn't comply 
with Title 38, which is the only section they could 
have filed such a 
property 
sign any 
notice of interest or lien on the 
under, and it's undisputed that they didn't 
agreement 
authorized such a 
title. 
And this 
with the Defendants that would have 
finding. It was (inaudible) on the 
isn't a trial on the merits, we're 
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here dismissing the complaint, because the notice of 
interest was improperly filed, it was filed in January 
of 1997. 
The report, that was provided as Exhibit C to 
our motion, reflects an improvement report that was 
done by the City with respect to the first three lots, 
and it was a certified copy and it was certified in 
script. 
But it states, fire apparatus was installed on 
November 12th, 1997, the fire access road installed on 
November 12th, 1997, the all curb and gutter is 
installed as of November 1st, 1997, road base or 
asphalt installed all by November 11th, 1997. 
And then underneath it it's script, all roads 
are based and most are asphalted, see the following map 
for asphalted roads. And then below it says, sewer 
cleared as per Annette 11/7/97. 
That document makes it clear that even though 
it was recorded --or that City report was prepared 
nearly eleven months after the notice of interest was 
filed, it still reflects that most of this work, with 
respect to that plat, was completed before the end of 
19 97, not 19 98 . 
This action was filed in March of 2002. As 
such, all of that work is well bovnnri i-v«o fnnr ^r^^^ 
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statute of limitations, even if there were a claim for 
unjust enrichment, which there isn't. 
With respect to the doctrines 
contract, quasi contract is just a gene 
states that in equity you can recover, 
written agreement or an oral agreement, 
of quasi 
ral term that 
if there isn't a 
under certain 
circumstances, a contract implied in fact is where the 
facts indicate that the parties agreed 
be a payment, even though there is noth 
is the 
six --
In this case, the affidavit of 
President of the company, states 
that there would 
ing in writing. 
Mr. Young, who 
in paragraph 
and I think paragraph six and seven need to be 
read together -- he comes in and he say 
all of the owners, and we asked them to 
them our property or to share in these 
agreed 
except 
And he went on and said that a 
to either participate or to sell 
for -- and agreed to either sell 
participate in the cost on a prorata ba 
the owners of eight lots, including tho 
Defendant, Gene Peaden." He testifies 
affidavit that he didn't agree to make 
there c 
1 requesj 
So I'm hard pressed to believe 
^ould be any factual dispute that 
zed that they be made or somehow 
s, we contacted 
either sell 
costs. 
11 of them 
their lots 
their lots or 
sis "except for 
se owned by 
in his own 
those payments. 
that any - -
the Peadens 
implied tnat 
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they would pay for those improvements when the 
President of Plaintiff's company has testified that he 
didn't, and certainly he didn't. 
He may have said, sure, that will improve the 
property, but I'm not willing to do it. They did it on 
their own timetable, they didn't seek his approval with 
respect to how they did it, it was their own deal, and 
they did it and the statute has now run. 
THE COURT: Well, what they're arguing is that 
your client didn't agree to pay, but he encouraged them 
to proceed anyway. How do you interpret --
MR. CALL: Well --
THE COURT: What is your argument about --
MR. CALL: I think in that circumstance, Your 
Honor 
THE COURT: I mean six says he said he 
wouldn't pay, seven says he encouraged them. 
MR. CALL: Yeah. Mr. Peaden was also 
contacted and acknowledged the need to install the 
improvements and the benefit to him by so doing and 
encouraged us to proceed with the installation of such 
improvements. 
He says, they first approached him and said, 
will you participate, will you agree to sell us your 
lot or pay for any of these expenses? No, I'm not 
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the development. And well, good 
with it, you should -- if you're 
property, we -- go ahead and do 
But the fact of the matter 
for their own benefit. It was c 
Page 46 
going to go ahead with 
, go ahead, good luck 
going to develop your 
it, that's terrific. 
is is that they did it 
lear that he had --
that he had told them that he wasn't going to 
participate. And I think, Your 
we're talking about is maybe equ 
misrepresentation. 
Honor, I think what 
itable estoppel or 
In this circumstance, even if we assume that 
he said, I won't pay, but I encourage you to do it, 
there's no reasonable reliance. 
Plaintiff had to do what it had 
to its detriment, it already has 
made the improvements because it 
City, as he reiterated, the City 
if we didn't do it, we couldn't 
lots. 
So whether he made such 
Why? Because the 
to do, it didn't rely 
acknowledged that it 
had 4 00 lots, and the 
expressly told us that 
develop any of our 
a statement or whether 
he didn't was immaterial, was not relied upon to any 
detriment of the Plaintiff. 
Your Honor, it's clear that lot 380 is well 
outside the ownership of the issue here. Any claim, 
t-h^rpforp should be barred clearly. The first three 
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lots were in sub -- Plat B, the records, the affidavit, 
the report, notice of interest all reflect that that's 
well beyond the four year statute of limitations. 
A cause of action accrues when the Plaintiff 
knows that he has a claim for relief. And in this 
circumstance the Plaintiff came to the conclusion that 
it had a claim for relief against the Defendant, 
Peaden, in January of 1997 when it went down to the 
County Recorder's Office and said, the undersigned 
Development Associates hereby claims and asserts an 
interest in the subject property pursuant to their 
improvements and developments which benefited the 
described property. 
Whatever the status of that development was, 
it had determined that it had done sufficient work and 
incurred sufficient contracts or whatever, that it had 
a right to assert a claim. And because it had a right 
to assert a claim as of that time, the four year 
statute of limitations was triggered. 
There's never been a payment, he's always 
refuted payment, and, therefore, even under their 
theory the four year statute would have run based upon 
that claim. I don't think it requires that the 
improvements all be made before the claim is asserted. 
1 TllP 1 3 W q o f f l p H TA7-i+-"h -i-^iC-T^^^ *- ~ ^ , i ^ ^ _ _ s: 1 
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relief, that when they arise that you may have 
continuing torts, you may have all sorts of things that 
are ongoing, but that doesn't mean that the claim for 
relief does not arise when it could have been plead. 
And based on everything that I've heard today, is 
that the Plaintiff had made some improvements, but not 
necessarily completed everything, but at least felt 
that it was in a situation where it could assert a 
claim, and did, in fact, assert a claim. 
With respect to the affidavit and the other 
records that have been submitted, we've cited in our 
brief, Your Honor, the Standing Associate Students of 
University decision, which states that the Court may 
consider outside materials in making its decision. 
Indeed, the two documents that we attached are both 
public records. The one is a -- is a copy of the 
Notice of Interest, which was recorded with the County, 
the other is a -- is the report that we've been 
referring to. 
And, Your Honor, I will indicate that there's 
been no objection or dispute as to the authenticity of 
either of those documents. I agree that if there was 
some dispute that they were inaccurate, that we would 
have to convert this to a Motion for Summary Judgment 
1 and mavbe, perhaps, Mr. Young's sworn affidavit does, 
Multi-Fage 
in fact convert it to a summary judgment. But 
our standpoint, it makes no difference. 
We think his affidavit supersedes the 
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, from 
complaint, because he is the person who has the 
personal knowledge, he lays it out, he covers 
facts that are in question, and we think that 
the controlling document in this circumstance. 
But, nevertheless, we still win, Your 
on statute limitations and on the substantive 
they have failed to state a claim for unjust 
enrichment, and, thus, as the Court to dismiss 
action. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
MR. MARSH: Your Honor, may I address 
issues that were not addressed by us? 
THE COURT: You may. 
MR. MARSH: First of all, Mr. Call's 
about $14,000,000 profit is totally without ba 
totally untrue, and requires his knowledge --
knowledge as to what the cost --
THE COURT: I don't think it really g 
the merits of the argument. 
the very 
that is 
Honor, 
law that 
the 
two 
statement 
sis and 
some 
oes to 
MR. MARSH: Okay. The second issue about the 
wrongful lien statute was not raised earlier, that 
1 statute provides that if somebody signed a document or 
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recorded a document which is improper, then you need to 
give twenty 
that -- that 
whatsoever. 
And 
those lots f 
We did so in 
that twenty 
• S o , 
apply and di 
days written notice to that party to remove 
document before you can claim any damages 
That has never been done. 
had they done so, we would have released 
rom the effect of that notice of interest. 
other cases, there were people who gave us 
day notice under the statute. 
under the statute, that simply doesn't 
d not cloud his title in such a way that it 
caused any damage to him whatsoever, because he didn't 
follow the w 
THE 
MR. 
be, based on 
saying, yeah 
removed it i 
request, is 
You may not 
If 
rongful lien statute. 
COURT: Do you want to respond? 
CALL: Yeah. My rebuttal to that would 
that acknowledgement, Your Honor, he's 
, we filed it wrongfully and we would have 
f somebody would have made a written 
an acknowledgement that it was wrongful. 
obtain equity with unclean hands. 
they knowingly and intentionally filed a 
wrongful lien, that's wrongful - - (Tape was turned 
over) -- in a summary type proceeding, much like an 
eviction proceeding, and expunge an unlawful 
(inaudible) 
1 Tha 
or notice of interest or something to that. 
t's a process for clearing title, but that 
jvcn>r*x* A v- i>r2T>r\j>rrTKirt TKm / e m \ iiV-t i QSI 
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mean that you go out and you can record any 
instrument against someone else's property, and 
that, oh, it's not wrongful unless they challenge it. 
That's 
of titl 
not true. The statute allows for the clearing 
e. 
And if Counsel, what he's indicated is, oh, 
yeah, we went out and filed these and they were 
wrongfu 
demand, 
knowing 
they're 
referri 
states, 
relief 
motion 
failure 
relief 
1 and we just removed them when anybody made a 
sustains our position that they filed it 
that it was wrongful when they filed it, and 
not entitled to any equity as a result of that. 
THE COURT: All right, Counsel. The Court, in 
ng to Rule 12b6, refers to the language which 
to dismiss for (inaudible) claim upon which 
may be granted on matters outside of -- if on a 
asserting defense number six to dismiss for 
of the pleading, state a claim upon which 
can be granted, matters outside the pleading are 
presented to and not excluded by the Court, the motion 
shall b 
dispose 
be give 
materia 
1 this, b 
e treated as one (inaudible) judgment and 
d of as provided in Rule 56, all parties should 
the reasonable opportunity to present all 
Is made pertinent to such a motion, Rule 56. 
I think that's where we're at here today on 
ecause there have been matters that have been 
Page 52 
presented outside the pleadings. Are there other --
Are there other pleadings that the parties believe 
should be presented 
motion? 
MR. CALL: 
MR. MARSH: 
with this, consider 
in order to treat this as a Rule 56 
No, Your Honor. 
If that's where the Court is going 
this as a Motion for Summary 
Judgment, I think the Court really needs to take a look 
at the cases that we cited by the Supreme Court, and 
suggest that, first of all, the statute of limitations 
is an affirmative defense which is not usually properly 
considered on a Motion to Dismiss, and because there 
are usually matters 
For example, 
of discovery that relate to that. 
if this man was out of the state 
for any period of time during this four year period of 
time, that time period is not included in the statute 
of limitations. Discovery is required to determine 
whether that statute is extended because of his absence 
from the state. 
Now, that's something we cannot get without 
discovery. So I would suggest that discovery is 
required before the 
conclusion. 
THE COURT: 
MR. CALL: 
Court can really make that 
Well, do you want to respond? 
Yeah, Mr. Peaden hasn't been out of 
T V E M f t n * * A V l>T71WrVI>T,rNJ<!n TKin / O A 1 \ ' J O C . I 1 QQ 
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the state other than maybe a week vacation here and 
there. He has not -- He's been in the state since 
1997. 
THE COURT: Well, it seems to me that we have 
some aspects of this motion are properly treated as 
summary judgment because affidavits have been -- have 
come into play. And I don't think the facts that 
under -- underpin a Motion to Dismiss for --on statute 
of limitation grounds would be included. 
What seems to be clear to me are the unjust 
enrichment arguments, in which there have been the 
affidavit of Steven R. Young and that have been 
referenced, and seem to me to be a very much referred 
to by both parties. 
And I think that perhaps the way the Court 
should -- should address the issue is -- is impart a 
Motion for Summary Judgment on the issues of which 
matters outside of the scope of the pleadings that have 
been addressed, and as matters within this Motion to 
Dismiss when there hasn't been any -- any issues 
referred to, and I think that that would cover the 
statute of limitations. 
It is the Court's decision to decide this on 
the merits, and to me that is primarily a decision that 
1 references the doctrine of unjust enrichment, is to 
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motion. 
I -- I believe that neither party is really 
ifference as to what the law is, that the 
that was quoted in the brief by Mr. Marsh, and 
I think there's at least a 1997 case that -- Promax 
Development vs. Madsen, 943 P2d 243, which -- which 
picks up 
establish 
contract, 
Defendant 
the knowl 
it unjust 
the same language and provides that to 
a contract in (inaudible) or a quasi 
that the Plaintiff must show, one, the 
receive the benefit, two, an appreciation of 
edge by the Defendant of the benefit. 
Three, under the circumstances that would make 
for the Defendant to retain the benefit 
without paying for it, as the implied in law aspect, to 
imply --
Plaintiff 
| Plaintiff 
expected 
to establish a contract implied in fact, the 
must show, one, Defendant requested the 
to perform the work, two, the Plaintiff 
the Defendant to compensate him or her for 
those services, and, three, Defendant knew or should 
have known that the Plaintiff expected compensation. 
It 
affidavit 
complaint 
the facts 
that are 
seems to the Court that the Steven R. Young 
really supersedes the pleadings in the 
and that they state what the -- they state 
as being asserted by the --by the Plaintiff 
-- that are being presented to the Court to j 
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defeat the motion. 
And it seems to me that, reading paragraphs 
six and seven together, there isn't any question that 
Defendant did not request the Plaintiff to perform the 
work, that's something that is (inaudible) recognized 
in paragraph six. 
And I think reading six and seven together I 
find nothing there to warrant the doctrine of implied 
contract, in fact, I would rely on the language which 
is referred to the Court from the restatement of 
restitution, but I think that's consistent with the law 
in the state of Utah. 
It seems to me what we have here is an 
incidental benefit, that a developer can impose costs 
on a passive landowner, because in order to obtain the 
benefit that the developer wishes, he must --he must 
perform that incidentally benefits someone else. I 
think that's the law here, and I think that that 
defeats the argument being made by the -- by the 
Plaintiff. 
On the issue of statute of limitations, again, 
though I rely upon these secondarily, it seems to me 
that there has been a basis made to dismiss on the 
statute of limitation claims as well, but I take that 
as being secondary to what I believe to be the decision 
lvjuiiii-rage 
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on the merits. 
On the issue of whether or not there was 
equity, there's certainly an argument that there was no 
equity on the part of the developer, but I think 
that's -- that's not a necessary element of the Court's 
decision here. Mr. Call, would you prepare an order 
consistent with my ruling? 
MR. CALL: I will, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: All right. We'll be in recess. 
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1 P R O C E E D I N G S 
2 THE COURT: We're on record in the matter of 
3 Development Associates, Inc. vs. Gene Peaden, Case No. 
4 020902121. Counsel, would you enter your appearances, 
5 please? 
6 MR. CALL: Steve Call, Your Honor, on behalf 
7 of the Defendant, Gene Peaden. 
8 MR. MARSH: Ralph Marsh for the Plaintiff, 
9 Development Associates, Inc. 
10 THE COURT: We're here to hear some objections 
11 filed by Mr. Marsh. Mr. Marsh, we'll hear your 
12 argument. 
13 MR. MARSH: Thank you, Your Honor. I should 
14 state that Mr. Call has revised his proposed order a 
15 couple of times, in fact, I guess three times based on 
16 some objections that I made, and many of my objections 
17 have been actually resolved. 
18 And I understand that in preparing this order 
19 he's able to make a statement of the facts as he 
20 believes the Court found. And I've simply objected, 
21 because I think some of his statements were not quite 
22 accurate, and I just wanted to get those objections on 
23 the record. 
24 And if the Court wants to go ahead and enter 
25 ( that order, that's up to the Court, but I still wanted 
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1 to make sure my objections were on the record. 
2 THE COURT: It's really appropriate, of 
3 course. 
4 MR. MARSH: Okay. And I think my written 
5 objections pretty well state the objection that I made. 
6 This is a Motion to Dismiss in which the Court and the 
7 parties must accept all of the allegations in the 
8 complaint as if they are true. 
9 And, therefore, I have simply stated that 
10 those are the facts in this case, and any attempt to 
11 recite facts or to find facts is -- is not appropriate, 
12 because the facts are as stated in the complaint, and 
13 he has selected facts here and there, as he desired, to 
14 support the decision, but left out some that I think 
15 are relevant. And so that's my main objection. 
16 But, for example, in my paragraph two I have 
17 objected to his paragraph five in which --
18 THE COURT: Now, let me just be sure I've got 
19 the right document, because there have been a number of 
20 these filed. 
21 MR. MARSH: Okay. 
22 THE COURT: There is one called Objection to 
23 Proposed Revised Order that's missing cases. Is that 
24 where we're at, or is there another one since then? 
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to 
re at? 
I 
order, 
:h ird 
THE COURT: -- because I don't think that's 
reached the file yet? 
MR. CALL: I do, I do. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. MARSH: And I did not, according to my 
file, file an additional objection after that third 
revised order, and so my objections are still based on 
my document entitled Objection to Proposed Second 
Revised Order. 
He did not make all of the changes that I 
made, but, nevertheless, he did remove one that I 
thought was objectionable, and that was he had asked 
for some affirmative relief, which I didn't think was 
appropriate on a Motion to Dismiss. He's not entitled 
to any affirmative relief because we're the complainina 
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party, of course. So that -- that objection is no 
longer relevant. 
But he simply made some statements in his 
findings that were not totally true, some of them based 
on some statements that I made before the Court in our 
oral argument. And, of course, they're made based on 
his memory of what my statements were, and I don't know 
that he obtained a transcript of the hearing. 
And so I've simply stated -- restated in my 
objection what I actually said to the Court. For 
example, in my paragraph four, objecting to paragraph 
nine of the so-called undisputed facts, he stated that 
Plaintiff's Counsel represented to the Court at the 
hearing that Plaintiff would have previously removed 
its notice of interest against Defendant's property had 
such request been made, because the improvements had 
not been made to numerous lots at the time the notice 
of interest was filed. 
I did not make that statement quite that way. 
I recited what I did state. I actually stated that 
notice of interest against Defendant's property would 
have been removed had a request to do so been made by 
Defendant pursuant to the wrongful lien statute, as 
Plaintiff had done in other cases where lot owners had 
— ^ ,-. +- ^  ^  «, -^.^i^^o^ r\-F hho nnfirp of inf.PTRSt . 
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Under that wrongful lien statute, there's a 
provision that says you have to give a twenty day 
notice to the party to remove that so-called wrongful 
lien, and if they don't remove it in that twenty days 
then you have a cause of action against them. No such 
request was ever made about under that wrongful lien 
statute, and that's what I stated before the Court. 
I did not ever state that the notice would 
have been removed because no improvements had been made 
to the lots. That's a statement I did not make, and 
yet he's included it in his findings. And so I'm just 
clarifying what I actually said before the Court. 
In paragraph two of my objections, again, 
objecting to paragraph five of the proposed undisputed 
facts, he's referring to the affidavit of Steven Young. 
In fact, the affidavit does not state that the 
Defendant, Peaden, did not agree or represent that he 
would pay for the improvements. 
And it further states in paragraph seven, this 
is quoting from the affidavit of Mr. Young, that Mr. 
Peaden was also contacted and acknowledged the need to 
install such improvements, and the benefit to him by 
doing so, and encouraged us to proceed with the 
installation of such improvements. 
Furthermore, in the complaint we've alleged 
Multi-Page m 
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1 that Defendant acknowledged the need to install such 
2 improvements and that such improvements would benefit 
3 him and increase the value of the lots owned by him, 
4 and encouraged and requested Plaintiff to proceed with 
5 the installation of such improvements. 
6 All I'm saying is that that's what the 
7 complaint says, which must be taken as true for 
8 purposes of a Motion to Dismiss. And if the Court 
9 looks at the affidavit, which is unopposed, the finding 
10 must be what the affidavit states and not the way that 
11 Mr. Call has worded it with his order. 
12 I don't know that I need to go through each 
13 one of these objections, except to state that I -- I've 
14 just made some corrections. For example, in paragraph 
15 five he refers to the notice -- or to the -- the 
16 pre-building permit report which was submitted to the 
17 Court, and then made a conclusion that -- first, that 
18 most of the improvements had been installed according 
19 to that report without changes that, in this third 
20 revised order, to many of the improvements. 
21 And I'm simply saying, all that report says is 
22 that some improvements were made, and he cannot 
23 conclude that most of them were in or any number of 
24 them were in, because there is no reference to what was 
25 I recruired, only that some improvements had been 
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installed. That's -- That's all I'm objecting to in 
that paragraph. 
Then in my paragraph seven I'm objecting to 
paragraph -- well, seven and eight, I'm objecting to 
paragraphs 20, 21 and 22 of the proposed order in which 
Mr. Call makes the statement that the Court concluded 
that the Plaintiff is guilty of unclean hands in 
equity. 
I wrote down in my notes, when the Court 
issued its order, that that was not part of the Court's 
decision, and so I simply make an objection based on 
that statement that I wrote down in my notes from the 
Court's ruling from the bench, unclean hands in equity 
is not part of the decision. 
And my paragraph nine is the one which refers 
to the affirmative relief which he had set forth in his 
order, but which he has removed from his latest version 
of the order. 
So -- And, again, my objections are made 
simply to put on the record my feelings that the order 
does not accurately recite either what the Court's 
ruling from the bench was or what the facts were, 
because the facts must be taken as true as stated in 
the complaint. 
THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Marsh. Mr. Call. 
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1 MR. MARSH: First, Your Honor, with respect to 
2 the facts, let me say that in drafting the order I did 
3 try to follow the Court's ruling, and the Court 
4 addressed this issue in its ruling in discussing the 
5 distinction between the allegations in the complaint 
6 and the affidavit that was filed by the Plaintiff's 
7 President. 
8 And if I could just read from his paragraph 
9 six, because the Court included that in its ruling, he 
10 testifies -- and, again, he's the President of the 
11 Plaintiff, and we're dealing with improvements that 
12 were made, and the paragraph disputed has to do with 
13 whether or not there's something erroneous with the 
14 Court's conclusion that there was no agreement for 
15 these improvements to be made -- and he testifies, 
16 before doing so we tried to contact all of the owners 
17 of the other lots to either purchase their lots or 
18 obtain their agreement to participate in the cost of 
19 improvements. 
20 All of the other owners, either before or 
21 after improvements were completed, acknowledged the 
22 benefit to them of the improvements and agreed either 
23 to sell their lots or to participate in the cost on a 
24 prorata basis, except for the owners of the eight lots, 
Page ll| 
And this Court concluded, based on that 
affidavit, that it was clear from his testimony that, 
in fact, he is indicating that my client, the 
Defendant, did not agree to pay for those improvements, 
it's laid out specifically in the President's 
affidavit. 
Counsel argued that the Court should ignore 
the affidavit and look solely to the complaint, and the 
Court addressed that, and I -- the language in the 
proposed order I believe reflects nearly precisely the 
Court's -- the spirit of the Court's ruling, and it 
says that, the Plaintiff filed a Motion to -- let's 
see •-- at the hearing before the Court, the Court 
clarified, and Defendant's Counsel confirmed, that the 
issue of timeliness was not at issue, that the Court's 
ruling should be based on the merits of the case. Just 
get the record right here. 
The Court has considered the sworn affidavit 
of Steven Young. I'm now in conclusion fifteen of the 
proposed third order. The Court has considered the 
sworn affidavit of Steven Young and other extraneous 
materials, and, therefore, Defendant's motion may be 
considered a Motion for Summary Judgment. 
However, even without the consideration of the 
affidavit and other extraneous materials, there are 
TYEn>n\*Av pi?prii?rrrMri rwr1 fsm>> ^9C-i i2£ 
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1 grounds which would sustain dismissal of all or part of 
2 the Plaintiff's complaint based upon the uncontested 
3 documents from the public records which were attached 
4 as exhibits to the Defendant's support memorandum, that 
5 being the statute of limitations and the undisputed 
6 fact that the notice of interest was recorded against 
7 my client's property before any of the improvements 
8 made thereto were made. 
9 And the Court indicated that, well, whether 
10 it's a Motion to Dismiss or whether it's a Motion for 
11 Summary Judgment, the Court said, I believe that I can 
12 take into consideration the sworn affidavit that was 
13 filed by the Plaintiff's President in connection with 
14 the motions pending before the Court. 
15 And, as such, the order states -- the Court 
16 indicated that when read together, those two 
17 paragraphs, that it is clear -- if I can find it 
18 'here.-- paragraph six of the sworn affidavit of Steven 
19 Young clarifies that the Defendant, Peaden, did not 
20 agree or represent to the Plaintiff that he would pay 
21 for the improvements to the development made or to be 
22 made by the Plaintiff. It's precisely what the Court 
23 ruled after considering the affidavit. 
24 The Court addressed the issue as to the 
25 I distinction of the affidavit and the complaint and said 
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that it could consider the affidavit, which was filed 
after the complaint. 
With respect to the other objection that was 
made, Counsel represented to the Court that, yes, this 
notice of interest was filed before any improvements 
were made. 
That is, in his objection of the proposed 
order, he stated, no, that's not exactly what I said, 
what I really said was we did record the interest 
before the improvements 
not to Plat A. 
I've revised th 
objection. All of my cl 
C, so I don't really thi 
the issue, but I've made 
I have further 
were made to Plats B and C, but 
e order to deal with that 
ient's lots were in Plats B and 
nk it was extremely relevant to 
that change nevertheless 
changed his objection to 
paragraph nine that stated that -- that there was 
objection because he had 
have removed the notice 
made. 
And, of course, 
he's saying, because the 
at the time the notice o 
have removed it. I put 
1 Counsel objected and sai 
some 
represented that they would 
of interest had a request been 
the whole purpose there is 
improvements hadn't been made | 
f interest was filed, we would 
that in the proposed order and 
d, no, that's not exactly what 
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I said, what I said is if they would have made a 
request that it be removed under the wrongful lien 
statute that I would have removed it. 
Well, the wrongful lien statute wasn't really 
enacted until after the notice of interest was filed. 
But I don't think it's really relevant, so I included 
the language that Counsel in the third r€>vised order, 
so I don't see that as being any further issue. 
In addition, I had indicated the Court's --
the spirit of the Court's ruling that the notice of 
interest shouldn't have been filed because the 
improvements hadn't been made, and that the appropriate 
method for obtaining a lien against property is through 
the mechanic's lien statute, which we discussed before 
the Court. 
Counsel has indicated that there should be no 
affirmative relief in the order of dismissal. I don't 
necessarily agree that that has to be, but we can file 
a separate action to expunge the (inaudible) on the 
property if that's what he wants, I'm happy to do that. 
So, rather than clutter the order, I have 
removed those paragraphs from the order. The revised 
order had indicated that the Court had concluded that 
that was the appropriate method for filing a notice of 
lien, and stated that the notice of lien, which is 
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still recorded against our property even after this 
Court's ruling, that -- that it should be removed. 
Counsel has indicated no, it shouldn't be removed, 
the Court cannot grant affirmative relief on a Motion 
to Dismiss, but all you can do for summary judgment is 
just dismiss the Plaintiff's claims. 
I don't agree with that, but I'm happy to file 
a separate action, we have other damages that need to 
be addressed. And so I have removed those provisions 
from the third revised amended order. 
With respect to unclean hands, Your Honor, I 
believe that the Court ruled, as I understood the 
Court, the Court ruled that this was simply not an 
action in restitution, that there was no basis for 
equity. 
That was the Court's primary basis for its 
ruling. The Court then, as an alternative, indicated 
that even if there were -- even if this were a claim 
for equity, it does appear that you're barred by the 
statute of limitations, because your notice of interest 
was filed in January of 1997, the other -- the report 
from the City indicates that the improvements were made 
sometime during that year, yet your action wasn't 
commenced until more than four years after the end of 
that 1997 period, which would have required that the 
DEPOMAX REPORTING, INC (801) 328-1188 
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action be filed sometime before March of 1998. 
So it would appear that the statute of 
limitations would bar your claim even if you had stated 
a claim in equity for unjust enrichment. 
And then finally, with respect to unclean 
hands, the unclean hands ruling, as I understood it, 
and I disagree with Counsel, I guess this is the only 
issue that appears to be clearly disputed, is that it 
was my understanding that the Court acknowledged that 
1 the lien had not been rightfully recorded based on 
Counsel's submission, and that it had -- it did not 
have clean hands, having come to this Court and asked 
for equity having intentionally filed a notice of 
interest against Plats B and C, which included my 
client's properties, knowing that there had been no 
improvements made to those lots. 
And in our reply memorandum we had cited that 
a party seeking equity must do so with clean hands. We 
cited two Supreme Court decisions wherein the Supreme 
Court stated that the doctrine has been described as 
follows: Under this maximum any willful act in regard 
to the matter in litigation which would be condemned or 
pronounced wrongful by the honest and fair-minded men 
will be sufficient to make the hands of the Applicant 
1 unclean. 
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There is no dispute in the proceeding before 
this Court, based upon the pleadings and the admission 
of Counsel, that a notice of interest against my 
client's lots was filed in January of 1997. There has 
been a certified copy submitted to the Court. 
It is undisputed that at the time that 
interest was recorded that there had been no 
improvements made against my client's properties, and, 
as such, it was a wrongful lien, did not comply with 
the mechanic's lien statute or any other statute that 
allows for the filing of a lien. 
We asserted to the Court that was indeed 
unclean hands and that it did not -- the Plaintiff have 
a claim in unjust enrichment. The Court had already 
ruled they didn't have a claim in unjust enrichment. 
And we consider that to be a third alternative to the 
Court's ruling. So I believe all of that is in harmony 
with the Court's ruling. 
We did, in attempt to conserve judicial 
resources and resolve this issue, I did -- I did make 
revisions to orders and try to get an order that was 
acceptable to Counsel, and I have filed and served the 
Defendant's third revised proposed order, I am 
comfortable with it, I am happy to defend it on appeal, 
1 and, as such, I would ask the Court to sign and enter 
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that order. 
THE COURT: Counsel, the only question I have 
from the argument is, is there some reason why it 
wouldn't be helpful to treat this as the summary 
judgment so that that affidavit could clearly be 
considered? 
MR. CALL: Yes. I think it should, Your 
Honor, and that's why I've made the specific findings. 
There was an objection that we had laid out findings. 
Rule 54 expressly provides that the Court, on a 
Motion to Dismiss or on a Motion for Summary Judgment 
under Rule 56, may make findings and conclusions. In 
fact, it said -- it says it doesn't have to unless the 
Court makes its ruling based on alternative grants. 
And, in this case, the Court did make 
alternative rulings, and so I think it is appropriate. 
So I have indicated what the Court has indicated, and 
that is that it's either -- if you go to paragraph one 
of the Order of Judgment on page seven, Defendant's 
Motion to Dismiss, which was converted, at least in 
part, to a Motion for Summary Judgment, is hereby 
granted. 
THE COURT: Right. 
MR. CALL: And that's what the Court ordered 
and that's -- and I tried to get the lancruacre iust --
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I've worked with lawyers that try to monkey with 
things, and that isn't the intent here, I tried to get 
something that reflected the Court's ruling, and I 
believe that I've done it at this point. 
THE COURT: Thank you. Mr. Marsh? 
MR. MARSH: Just a brief response, Your Honor, 
with respect to the equity argument. And I understand 
the Court can include anything it wishes in its order, 
but I'm simply quoting from my notes taken at the time 
that you ruled from the bench. 
After it made its ruling with respect to the 
implied in fact contract and the statute of 
limitations, it said that there is no equity, it's 
true, but that's not part of my decision. 
I wrote that down, and that's -- that was the 
basis for my objection to his conclusion of anything 
with respect to equity and unclean hands. The rest of 
it I submit based on my objections. 
THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Marsh. Well, 
Counsel, this is -- I appreciate, frankly, the 
scholarship of both sides in trying to refine its 
order. It's a complicated area. 
I'm comfortable at this point, frankly, with 
the order that Mr. Call has prepared, and I think I'm 
going to overruled the objections that have been made 
DEPOMAX REPORTING. INC (801) 328-1188 
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Rest. Of Restitution 
Section 106 
RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW 
OF 
RESTITUTION 
QUASI CONTRACTS 
AND 
CONSTRUCTIVE TRUSTS 
AS ADOPTED AND PROMULGATED 
BY THE 
AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE 
AT WASHINGTON, D. C. 
MAY 8, 1936 
1937 
AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE PUBLISHERS 
ST. PAUL 
Ch.3 COERCION §106 
§ 106. INCIDENTAL BENEFIT TO ANOTHER FROM 
PERFORMANCE OF ONE'S DUTY OR PROTEC-
TION OF ONE'S THINGS. 
A person who, incidentally to the performance 
of his own duty or to the protection or the improve-
ment of his own things, has conferred a benefit up-
on another, is not thereby entitled to contribution. 
Comment: 
a. Sections 76-105 deal with situations in which 
indemnity or contribution is granted to a person who, 
in the performance of his own duty or in the protec-
tion of his own interests, confers a benefit upon an-
other. There is, however, no principle which is gen-
erally applicable by which restitution is granted to one 
who has been coerced by the existence of a duty or a 
danger to his own interests into doing an act which is 
beneficial to another. 
Illustrations: 
1. A, the owner of land on a river bank, rea-
sonably fearing immediate inundation, requests 
his neighbor, B, to join him in building a dike 
which will preserve the land of both. B refuses. 
A builds a dike which saves both pieces of land 
from being flooded. A is not entitled to contri-
bution from B. 
2. A and B are adjoining mine owners 
whose mines have been flooded by seepage from 
a near-by swamp. A requests B to join him in 
the draining of the swamp. B refuses. A drains 
the swamp, thereby drying both mines. He is 
not entitled to contribution from B. 
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3. Same facts as in Illustration 2, except 
that C had contracted to keep water out of A's 
mine, and he drains the swamp in the perform-
ance of his duty to A. C is not entitled to con-
tribution from B. 
b. The rules as to general average, as that term 
is used in admiralty, are not within the scope of the 
Restatement of this Subject. 
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Utah R. CIU. P. 12(b) 
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
Rule 12. Defenses and objections 
* * * 
(b) How presented. Every defense, in law or fact, to claim for relief in any pleading, 
whether a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, shall be asserted in the 
responsive pleading thereto if one is required, except that the following defenses may at 
the option of the pleader be made by motion: (1) lack of jurisdiction over the subject 
matter, (2) lack of jurisdiction over the person, (3) improper venue, (4) insufficiency of 
process, (5) insufficiency of service of process, (6) failure to state a claim upon which 
relief can be granted, (7) failure to join an indispensable party. A motion making any of 
these defenses shall be made before pleading if a further pleading is permitted. No 
defense or objection is waived by being joined with one or more other defenses or 
objections in a responsive pleading or motion or by further pleading after the denial of 
such motion or objection. If a pleading sets forth a claim for relief to which the adverse 
party is not required to serve a responsive pleading, the adverse party may assert at the 
trial any defense in law or fact to that claim for relief. If, on a motion asserting the 
defense numbered (6) to dismiss for failure of the pleading to state a claim upon which 
relief can be granted, matters outside the pleading are presented to and not excluded by 
the court, the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as 
provided in Rule 56, and all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to present all 
material made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56. 
